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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 
Gary Born* 
Abstract: Over the past two decades, the status of customary international law in U.S. 
courts has been the subject of vigorous debate. On the one hand, proponents of the “modernist” 
position contend that rules of customary international law are presumptively rules of federal 
law, which apply directly in U.S. courts and preempt inconsistent state law even in the absence 
of federal legislative or executive authorization. On the other hand, the “revisionists” argue 
that, in the absence of congressional legislation or a U.S. treaty, rules of customary 
international law are generally not matters of federal law, and will therefore generally be 
governed by state law.  This Article argues for an approach that rejects central elements of both 
the modernist and revisionist positions, while also adopting other aspects of both positions. 
The Article contends that the text, structure, and objectives of the Constitution, and the weight 
of judicial authority, require treating all rules of customary international law as rules of federal 
law, but that such rules will be directly applicable in U.S. courts only when the federal political 
branches have expressly or impliedly provided for judicial application of a particular rule. 
This approach would mirror the way in which courts apply U.S. treaties and other 
international agreements—treating them as matters of federal law but applying their provisions 
in U.S. courts only to the extent authorized by the political branches. The intentions of the 
political branches regarding application of particular rules of customary international law by 
U.S. courts can be deduced from a number of indicia, analogous to those applied to determine 
whether particular treaty provisions are self-executing; these include the content and character 
of the relevant rule of international law, statements by the Executive or Legislative branch, and 
the content, character, and historical treatment of related rules of international law. 
The position proposed in this Article produces materially different results from either the 
modernist or the revisionist approaches. In many cases, the analysis proposed in this Article 
will lead to the conclusion that particular customary international law rules—such as head of 
state or consular immunity and attribution of state responsibility—are directly applicable in 
U.S. courts, notwithstanding the absence of express authorization by the political branches. In 
other cases, including many emerging human rights protections, this analysis will lead to a 
conclusion that particular rules of customary international law are not applicable in U.S. courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few issues of international law have attracted more attention, or 
inspired greater fervor, in the United States than the status of customary 
international law in U.S. courts. Contemporary commentators and courts 
have written prolifically on whether rules of customary international law 
are governed by U.S. federal law or U.S. state law and when these rules 
may be applied by U.S. courts. These various authorities have arrived at 
widely differing, and largely irreconcilable, answers to these questions. 
Citing constitutional text and judicial precedent, an extensive body of 
authority has concluded that rules of customary international law are 
presumptively rules of federal law, which apply directly in U.S. courts 
and preempt inconsistent state law even in the absence of federal 
legislative or executive authorization. Citing other constitutional 
provisions and judicial precedent, another body of authority has 
concluded that, in the absence of congressional legislation or a U.S. treaty, 
rules of customary international law will generally be matters of state law. 
A third body of commentary proposes other approaches, suggesting that 
customary international law be treated either as a form of general common 
law (subject to independent development in state and federal courts) or a 
sui generis category of “non-preemptive federal law.” 
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None of these approaches is consistent with the text, structure, and 
objectives of the Constitution, judicial authority, or sound policy. The 
modern position, which presumptively regards all customary international 
law as federal common law, directly applicable in U.S. courts, ignores 
critical limitations on federal courts’ lawmaking authority, particularly in 
a field implicating the Nation’s foreign relations. Conversely, the so-
called revisionist view, which generally results in customary international 
law being treated as state law, accords insufficient importance to federal 
authority over U.S. foreign relations and the manner in which those 
relations are conducted. For similar reasons, the alternatives proposed by 
other commentators would produce results that are inconsistent with both 
the Constitution and judicial authority. 
This Article argues for an approach that rejects central elements of both 
the modernist and revisionist positions, while also adopting other aspects 
of those positions. The Article contends that the text, structure, and 
objectives of the Constitution, and the weight of judicial authority, require 
treating all rules of customary international law as rules of federal law, 
but that such rules will be directly applicable in U.S. courts only when the 
federal political branches have expressly or impliedly provided for 
judicial application of a particular rule. This ensures that all customary 
international law rules, binding on the United States internationally, are 
rules of federal law, subject to uniform application and interpretation by 
federal courts. At the same time, this approach ensures that particular rules 
of customary international law, like provisions of treaties and other 
international agreements, will be directly applicable in U.S. courts when, 
but only when, the U.S. political branches have so provided. 
This approach is mandated by the text, structure, and objectives of the 
Constitution, which provide the federal government, as distinguished 
from the several states, with broad authority over U.S. foreign relations. 
This expansive federal authority reflects a compelling need for the United 
States to speak internationally with “one voice,” particularly regarding the 
content of international law and the Nation’s international obligations. 
Given this, the revisionists’ conclusion that rules of international law are 
generally matters of state law would violate the Constitution’s allocation 
of foreign affairs power and work serious damage to the political 
branches’ ability to conduct U.S. foreign relations. Conversely, the 
Constitution limits the federal courts’ authority independently to make 
and apply federal law, proscribing any judicially-created “general 
common law.” Given these limits, and the risks of judicial interference in 
U.S. foreign relations, the modernist position that virtually all rules of 
customary international law are directly applicable in U.S. courts, 
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regardless of the intentions of the U.S. political branches, is also 
untenable. 
Although judicial authority is diverse, it is most consistent with treating 
all rules of customary international law as rules of federal law, but also 
with particular rules of international law applying directly in U.S. courts 
only when the federal political branches have expressly or impliedly 
provided for such judicial application. Thus, U.S. courts have applied 
rules of customary international law in countless cases since the founding 
of the Republic, but have consistently refused to do so without sufficient 
indication of political branch intent—effectively treating customary 
international law rules in the same manner as U.S. treaties and other 
international agreements. Likewise, particularly since Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins1 gave the issue importance, U.S. courts have treated rules of 
customary international law as rules of federal law. In practice, this 
approach has ensured federal supremacy over issues of international law 
while preventing unauthorized judicial law-making or interference in U.S. 
foreign relations. 
This Article argues that, consistent with the text, structure, and 
objectives of the Constitution and judicial authority, all rules of customary 
international law have the status of federal law. It also argues, however, 
that the question whether a particular rule of customary international law 
is directly applicable in U.S. courts depends, as with U.S. treaties and 
other international agreements, on a separate inquiry into whether the 
federal political branches have expressly or impliedly provided for 
judicial application of that rule. The Article contends, again as with 
treaties, that the intentions of the political branches are deducible from a 
number of indicia, analogous to those applied to determine whether 
particular treaty provisions are self-executing; these indicia include the 
content and character of the relevant rule of international law, statements 
by the Executive or Legislative branch, and the content, character, and 
historical treatment of related rules of international law. 
The position proposed in this Article produces materially different 
results from either the modern or the revisionist approaches. All rules of 
customary international law would be treated as federal law, thus 
providing for a more expansive body of federal law than the modernist (or 
revisionist) position; at the same time, the Article’s approach results in 
more frequent application of customary international law in U.S. courts 
than urged by revisionists, but less frequent application than under the 
modernist position. In many cases, the analysis proposed in this Article 
will lead to the conclusion that particular customary international law 
                                                     
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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rules—such as head of state or consular immunity and attribution of state 
responsibility—are directly applicable in U.S. courts, notwithstanding the 
absence of express authorization by the political branches. In other cases, 
including many emerging human rights protections, this analysis will lead 
to a conclusion that particular rules of international law are not applicable 
in U.S. courts. 
Part I of this Article describes the current status of customary 
international law in U.S. courts, outlining the modernist position, the 
revisionist view, and the alternative positions. Part II critiques the 
treatment of international law under existing analyses, arguing that the 
modern and revisionist positions are both flawed in critical respects. Part 
III proposes an alternative approach to the subject, adopting aspects of 
both the modern and revisionist positions. 
I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS 
Until the turn of this century, the status of customary international law 
in U.S. courts was of only occasional, and usually passing, interest. 
Although courts frequently applied rules of customary international law, 
the question whether these rules were state, or federal, law seldom arose. 
Rather, the so-called “modernist position” was that customary 
international law is federal law, directly applicable in U.S. courts and 
prevailing over inconsistent state law. This position was codified in 1987 
by the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States,2 reflecting what was regarded at the time as “an ‘unquestioned’ 
principle of the law of foreign relations.”3 
The modernist position was not only questioned, but vigorously 
challenged, by Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and other “revisionists” in 
the late 1990s.4 Their work challenged the constitutionality of the 
                                                     
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. 
3. Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295. 
4. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 543–44 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, Breard]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming 
Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 
GEO. L.J. 479 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Charming Betsy Canon]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of 
Customary International Law in U.S. Courts—Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
807, 809 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 849 (1997) [hereinafter 
Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts 
and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley & 
04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2017  9:45 AM 
1646 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1641 
 
modernist position, arguing that rules of customary international law lack 
the status of federal law unless expressly adopted by congressional 
legislation or a U.S. treaty. The revisionists disputed assertions that 
customary international law had historically been regarded as federal law, 
as well as claims that international law could legitimately take the form 
of judge-made federal common law. In their words, customary 
international law “does not have the status of federal common law.”5 
The revisionist critique was met by a vigorous defense of the modernist 
position.6 The modernists argued that the revisionist position ignored the 
historical role of U.S. courts in applying international law7 and would 
produce incongruous results, with different state courts adopting 
conflicting positions on the content of international law rules.8 In the 
words of one modernist, “[t]reating international law as some species of 
state law does not foster original intent, states’ rights, judicial restraint, 
executive discretion, or democratic decisionmaking.”9 
Judicial decisions mirrored the modernist and revisionist positions, 
with different lower courts adopting different positions on the status of 
customary international law.10 The Supreme Court eventually addressed 
                                                     
Goldsmith, Federal Courts]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International 
Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Pinochet]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human 
Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 332 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Human 
Rights]; Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International 
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007) [hereinafter Bradley, 
Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing Relevance]. There had been earlier indications of dissent from the 
modern position, but these attracted limited attention. A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, 
and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Weisburd, State Courts]; Phillip 
R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986) 
[hereinafter Trimble, A Revisionist View].  
5. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 821.  
6. Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825 
(1998) [hereinafter Koh, State Law?]; Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary 
International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 383 
(1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After 
Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 395–96 (1997) [hereinafter Stephens, Law of our Land]; Carlos M. 
Vasquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate 
Positions and A Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1498–1500 (2011). 
7. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1827 (“[E]ven casual reflection compels the conclusion that 
Bradley and Goldsmith are utterly mistaken.”). 
8. Id. at 1827–29. 
9. Id. at 1861. 
10. Compare Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (“settled proposition that federal 
common law incorporates international law”), Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos Human 
Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is . . . well settled that the law of nations is part 
of federal common law.”), and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(“[I]nternational law has an existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress.”), with 
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the issue,11 but did so inconclusively,12 with both the modernists and 
revisionists seizing on the Court’s decision as vindication of their 
positions.13 Lower courts have responded similarly, continuing to reach 
inconsistent decisions about the status of customary international law.14 
At the same time, the modernists and revisionists have both moderated 
their positions in some respects, edging modestly toward common ground, 
but ultimately producing neither meaningful consensus nor analytical 
clarity.15 
As discussed below, this treatment of customary international law in 
U.S. courts is dysfunctional. It has produced, and continues to produce, 
uncertainty about the character and sources of international law in the 
United States and the circumstances in which international law will be 
applied by U.S. courts. This uncertainty about basic issues of domestic 
constitutional authority and the relationship between U.S. and 
international law risks interference with U.S. foreign relations, undercuts 
the role of U.S. courts in the development of international law, and 
imposes serious costs on litigants and lower courts. More fundamentally, 
as both revisionists and modernists have recognized, resolving this 
                                                     
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Only when 
international-law principles are incorporated into a statute or a self-executing treaty do they become 
domestic U.S. law enforceable in U.S. courts.”), Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1146–47 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810–23 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).  
11. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728–31, 734–35 (2004). 
12. Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 28, 28 (2007) (“Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain has become 
something of a Rorschach blot . . . .”). 
13. Compare Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain “The Door Is Still Ajar” for Human Rights 
Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 533–38 (2004), and Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying 
One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human 
Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2255 (2004), with Bradley, Goldsmith & 
Moore, Continuing Relevance, supra note 4, at 892–93. 
14. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 13 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[S]tatutes and self-executing treaties 
are domestic U.S. law and thus enforceable in U.S. courts. By contrast, non-self-executing treaties 
and customary international law are not domestic U.S. law.”); Jovic v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 69 F. Supp. 
3d 750, 760 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“‘Laws’ in the context of Section 1331 includes federal common law, 
which includes the laws of nations or customary international law.”); Tarros S.p.A. v. United States, 
982 F. Supp. 2d 325, 338 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“courts may no longer create ‘general’ federal 
common law, and are restricted to ‘limited enclaves’ where Congress has authorized its creation[,]” 
such as the Alien Tort Statute).  
15. See infra section II.A.1 (some revisionists appear to accept expanded concept of political 
branch authorization of judicial application of customary international law); infra section II.A.1; infra 
note 135; infra section III.A (some modernists appear to limit types of customary international law 
rules that are judicially applicable). 
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uncertainty, and the debate giving rise to it, is essential in “a democratic 
society increasingly governed by international law.”16 
A. The Modernists: “The Modern View Is that Customary 
International Law Is Federal Law and Its Determination by the 
Federal Courts Is Binding on the State Courts” 
The modernists’ position is superficially straightforward: all rules of 
customary international law are rules of federal law, directly applicable in 
U.S. courts. In the words of the Third Restatement, “the modern view is 
that customary international law in the United States is federal law and its 
determination by the federal courts is binding on the State courts.”17 As a 
consequence, although there is no “canonical account” of the modern 
position,18 it generally holds that all customary international law rules are 
judicially applicable and prevail over state law: “[a]ny rule of customary 
international law, is federal law (§ 111), [and] it supersedes inconsistent 
State law or policy whether adopted earlier or later.”19 For the same 
reason, claims based on customary international law “aris[e] under” 
federal law for purposes of Article III and statutory federal question 
jurisdiction.20 
The modern position is unequivocal in asserting that all rules of 
customary international law are presumptively applicable in U.S. courts, 
without the need for implementing legislation or further acts of the 
political branches.21 Thus, “[i]nternational law . . . is ‘self-executing’ and 
is applied by courts in the United States without any need for it to be 
enacted or implemented by Congress.”22 This position assertedly applies 
to all customary international law rules, which, as discussed below,23 
                                                     
16. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 821; see also Koh, State Law?, supra 
note 6, at 1855; Neuman, supra note 6, at 389.  
17.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 3. 
18. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 849. 
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 115 cmt. e; see also Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over 
Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 377 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Sorting Out] 
(“[C]ustomary international law is ‘supreme’ in its relation to state law.”); Koh, State Law?, supra 
note 6, at 1825 (“[I]nternational law, as applied in the United States, must be federal law.”). 
20. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1559–
60 (1984) [hereinafter Henkin, International Law as Law]; Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 378. 
21. Some modernists envisage some (limited) constraints on the types of customary international 
law rules that are directly applicable in U.S. courts. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1835 (“Once 
customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should presumptively incorporate them into 
federal common law . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
22. Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note 20, at 1561. 
23. See infra section II.A.1. 
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extend to a wide range of subjects. Thus, regardless of their character 
“customary international law is always federal law and always displaces 
[state] law, without consideration of the nature of the particular rule at 
issue.”24 
The modernist position recognizes, of course, that customary 
international law may be overridden by subsequent federal legislation.25 
Where Congress does not legislate to the contrary, however, the modern 
position provides that customary international law, as interpreted by the 
federal courts, is the supreme law of the land and preempts state law.26 As 
Professor Neuman summarizes the modern position: “[t]he existence and 
content of rules of customary international law that are binding on the 
United States is to be determined as a matter of federal law. Such rules 
are presumptively incorporated into the U.S. domestic legal system and 
given effect as rules of federal law.”27 
Although the consequences of the modern position are straightforward, 
the basis for that position is less clear. The explanation most widely 
endorsed by modernists is that customary international law is federal 
common law,28 analogous to the rule adopted in Banco Nacional de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino.29 On this theory, the federal courts possess authority to 
incorporate international law into U.S. federal law by virtue of the 
uniquely federal interests in the Nation’s foreign relations30 and the 
historic practice of federal courts applying customary international law as 
                                                     
24. Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 437.  
25. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 384 (“Our system follows a practice of presumptive enforceability 
of customary international law, subject to congressional override.”); Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, 
at 1835 (“Once customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should presumptively 
incorporate them into federal common law, unless the norms have been ousted as law for the United 
States by contrary federal directives.”). 
26. Neuman, supra note 6, at 383 (“[T]he modern position entails the conclusion that, in the face 
of congressional silence, customary international law will be supreme over the laws of the States.”). 
27. Id. at 376. 
28. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1835 (“[F]ederal courts retain legitimate authority to 
incorporate bona fide rules of customary international law into federal common law.”); Neuman, 
supra note 6, at 376 n.31. 
Other modernists conclude that customary international law rules “resemble,” but are not identical 
to, federal common law rules. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A 
Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 876, 878 (1987) (customary 
international law “resembles” or “is like” federal common law); cf. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 
1835 n.61 (“[C]ustomary international law is federal common law (not simply ‘like federal common 
law’).”). 
29. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
30. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1838 (“[T]he capacity of federal courts to incorporate 
customary international law into federal law—unless ousted by contrary federal directive—is 
absolutely critical to maintaining the coherence of federal law in areas of international concern.”). 
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“part of our Law.”31 Thus, as one court put it, “the law of nations . . . has 
always been part of the federal common law . . . . International law has an 
existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress.”32 And, as 
detailed above, the modernists would apply this analysis to all rules of 
customary international law: simply by virtue of a rule’s status as 
customary international law, it also acquires the status of federal common 
law, directly applicable in U.S. courts. 
B. The Revisionists: Customary International Law “Does Not Have 
the Status of Federal Common Law” 
There is also no canonical account of the revisionist position. Stated 
most simply, the revisionists’ claim is that the modernists are wrong and 
that customary international law “does not have the status of federal 
common law.”33 More specifically, the revisionists reason that customary 
international law was not included in Article VI’s catalogue of sources of 
federal law,34 and that, absent authorization by treaty or statute, under 
Article VI, federal judges lack the authority to make (or find) rules of 
international law or to incorporate these rules into U.S. law.35 Thus, “the 
judicial federalization of all [customary international law] requires some 
authorization from the Constitution or a federal statute.”36 
The revisionists contend that, for much of the Nation’s history, 
customary international law was not regarded as federal law. Instead, 
international law was part of the “general common law,” which, during 
the era of Swift v. Tyson,37 was neither state nor federal law, and which 
federal and state courts were, in principle, free to interpret in independent, 
potentially conflicting ways. As Professors Bradley and Goldsmith 
conclude, “[customary international law] was not viewed as federal law 
during most of our nation’s history.”38 
The centerpiece of the revisionists’ position is Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins and its declaration that, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the 
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any 
                                                     
31. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1838 n.23. 
32. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980). 
33. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 821. 
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
35. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 850. 
36. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 354.  
37. 41 U.S. 1 (1938). 
38. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 332. 
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case is the law of the state.”39 According to the revisionists, absent an 
applicable federal statute (or U.S. treaty), Erie forbids federal courts from 
independently making or applying rules of “general” common law: 
“[federal] courts should not apply [customary international law] as federal 
law unless authorized to do so by the federal political branches.”40 
Applying this standard, the revisionists required an express statement, in 
either a treaty or federal legislation, that a rule of customary international 
law had been incorporated into federal law.41 They reasoned that this was 
necessitated by “well-accepted notions of American representative 
democracy, federal common law, separation of powers, and federalism.”42 
More recently, some revisionists have suggested less demanding 
standards of political branch incorporation of international law, although 
even these still require “at least to some degree, [a showing of] political 
branch authorization.”43 
The revisionists acknowledge that the political branches may, and 
frequently have, incorporated particular rules of international law into 
federal law, citing the Torture Victim Protection Act, the Alien Tort 
Statute, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.44 But the revisionist 
position denies that Congress has incorporated all (or very many) 
customary international law rules into federal law. In their words, 
“Congress has never purported to incorporate all of [customary 
                                                     
39. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Justice Brandeis would of course have meant 
to include treaties concluded pursuant to Article I, but his focus was on domestic, rather than 
international, matters.  
40. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 319. 
41. Bradley, Breard, supra note 4, at 543 (“treaty or statute”); Bradley & Goldsmith, Human 
Rights, supra note 4, at 355 (“federal treaty or statute”); Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, 
supra note 4, at 819–20 (contemplating political branch authorization only by legislation or treaty); 
id. at 868–69 (endorsing “plain statement” requirement); Trimble, A Revisionist View, supra note 4, 
at 716.  
42. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 821. 
43. Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing Relevance, supra note 4, at 924; see also id. at 921–
22 (referring to federal common law rules of customary international law based on “executive branch” 
authorization); Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2260, 2269 (denying a 
requirement for “explicit and unambiguous directive”).  
44. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 356; see also Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 
F.3d 763, 777 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e find Congress’s enactment of the TVPA, and the policies it 
reflects, to be both instructive and consistent with our view of the common law regarding these aspects 
of jus cogens.”); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Consistent with that 
constitutionally assigned role, Congress sometimes enacts statutes to codify international-law norms 
derived from non-self-executing treaties or customary international law, or to fulfill international-law 
obligations. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 is a good example of that kind of 
legislation.”).  
04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2017  9:45 AM 
1652 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1641 
 
international law] into federal law,”45 and “Congress’s selective 
incorporation would be largely superfluous if [customary international 
law] were already incorporated wholesale into federal common 
law . . . .”46 
The revisionist position rejects arguments that customary international 
law can generally be regarded as federal common law. The revisionists 
cite the exceptional character of federal common law and limited 
circumstances in which the Supreme Court has recognized federal 
common law rules.47 They also question the extent to which the Nation’s 
foreign relations involve matters of uniquely federal interest, noting the 
existence of concurrent authority (both federal and state) over many 
aspects of “foreign relations.”48 More fundamentally, the revisionists 
emphasize that federal authority over foreign relations is vested in the 
political branches,49 not in the federal courts, concluding that Erie denies 
federal judges the power to make rules of federal law without 
authorization by the political branches.50 
The revisionists also emphasize the differences between “traditional” 
international law (which principally concerns matters of inter-state 
relations, such as sovereign immunity and prize law) and “new” 
international law (which, in their view, principally concerns human rights 
protections, including states’ treatment of their own nationals).51 As a 
consequence, revisionists observe, “[customary international law] is now 
viewed as regulating many matters that were traditionally regulated by 
domestic law,”52 posing even more serious concerns about federal 
intrusion into areas of historical state regulatory authority. 
Moreover, the revisionists argue that application of customary 
international law by federal courts will interfere with the political 
branches’ conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations. Citing the breadth of 
“new” rules of customary international law, the revisionists conclude that 
                                                     
45. Note, An Objection to Sosa—And to the New Federal Common Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2077, 
2086 (2006).  
46. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 857. 
47. Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2272. 
48. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 866. 
49. The revisionists also contend that, historically, it was the federal political branches, not the 
judiciary, that addressed asserted breaches of international law. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, 
supra note 4, at 332 (“During at least the first 150 years of our nation, our constitutional system 
permitted states to violate CIL unless and until the federal political branches said otherwise through 
enacted federal law.”). 
50. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 856–57. 
51. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 325–28. 
52. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 840–41. 
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application of these rules by U.S. courts would have serious foreign 
relations consequences.53 They also contend that federal judges lack the 
institutional capacity to make judgments about the Nation’s foreign 
relations, arguing again against the incorporation of customary 
international law by federal courts without clear authorization by the 
federal political branches.54 
For these reasons, the revisionists conclude that there is generally no 
basis for treating customary international law as federal common law. 
Instead, as outlined above, Erie requires federal courts to apply state law 
(or no law) in the absence of any federal rule of decision: “[u]nder Erie, 
if [customary international law] is not federal law, federal courts are not 
to apply it unless they determine that it is part of state law.”55 It is therefore 
clear, under the revisionists’ analysis, that where state courts have adopted 
a rule of customary international law as state law, federal courts will be 
obligated to apply that rule, notwithstanding the refusal of federal courts 
to recognize a rule of federal law. The revisionists acknowledge this 
possibility, but predict that “in most cases, states would rarely incorporate 
[customary international law] into state law,” with the result that 
“[customary international law] simply would not be a rule of decision in 
federal court.”56 
C. The Others: “Customary International Law Can Have an 
Intermediate Status Between State and Federal Law” 
Other views of customary international law in U.S. courts have also 
emerged, provoked by skepticism about both the modernist and revisionist 
positions. These alternatives have taken a variety of forms, all of which 
are irreconcilable both with one another and with the modernist and 
revisionist positions. 
Some commentators have suggested resurrecting Swift v. Tyson’s 
“general common law,” but limited to international law. This approach 
would “treat[] customary international law as ‘general’ law—a third 
category of law, neither state nor federal in nature . . . available for both 
state and federal courts to apply in appropriate cases . . . .”57 This position 
                                                     
53. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 330, 368–69. 
54. Id. at 345–47. 
55. Id. at 349. 
56. Id. at 349–50. 
57. Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 370; see also Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 4, at 3 
(“[A] new analysis . . . that analogizes customary international law to the law of a foreign sovereign 
and applies it accordingly.”). 
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assertedly preserves the historic status of customary international law in 
U.S. courts while limiting the extent of federal intervention in traditional 
areas of state sovereign authority.58 
A related approach would treat customary international law as so-called 
“non-preemptive federal law,”59 which federal courts could apply, but 
only in the absence of contrary state law. These rules of international law 
would apply in federal courts (with state courts being free, but not obliged, 
to apply them). The rationale for this approach parallels that of the 
revisionists, reasoning that Article VI does not include customary 
international law among the forms of preemptive federal law and that 
Article I, section 8 requires that customary international law be 
incorporated by Congress in order to apply in U.S. courts.60 
Other commentary has proposed treating customary international law 
as so-called “non-preemptive non-federal law,”61 applicable in federal 
courts (regardless of conflicting state law), but not in state courts. Under 
this analysis, which assertedly involves minimal interference with state 
sovereignty, customary international law would only “announce the rule 
for the federal branches,” and not the several states.62 
Finally, another body of commentary has agreed with the revisionists 
that customary international law is not ordinarily federal law, but contends 
that some rules of international law do constitute federal law, which 
prevails over inconsistent state law and which both state and federal courts 
are obligated to apply, even absent political branch authorization. 
Specifically, “history and structure demonstrate that courts have applied 
certain principles derived from the law of nations as a means of upholding 
the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs powers to Congress and the 
President.”63 Under this analysis, federal courts are constitutionally 
authorized to apply customary international law rules (and related 
doctrines, such as the act of state doctrine)64 that implicate the political 
                                                     
58. Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 502–03. 
59. Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Non-Preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 
555, 558 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, International Law]; see also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE 
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 346–55 (2007).  
60. Ramsey, International Law, supra note 59, at 559–61.  
61. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: 
Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 97 (2004). 
62. Id. 
63. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (2009). 
64. See infra section III.B.1; GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 888–963 (6th ed. 2017) (discussing the act of state doctrine). 
04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2017  9:45 AM 
2017] CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS 1655 
 
branches’ authority over war and recognition of foreign states.65 Apart 
from these constitutionally mandated rules, however, customary 
international law is a matter of state (or foreign) law unless the federal 
political branches have authorized federal courts to apply it.66 
II. THE PROPER STATUS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN U.S. COURTS 
One of the first U.S. Supreme Court decisions to consider the 
application of customary international law by American courts observed 
that “[o]ur situation being new, unavoidably creates new and intricate 
questions. We have sovereignties moving within a sovereignty.”67 The 
existence of multiple sovereignties—federal and state—as well as 
multiple branches of the governments of those sovereignties—
Legislative, Executive and Judicial—continue to give rise to intricate 
questions when U.S. courts consider issues of customary international 
law. The intricacy of these questions is heightened by the absence of 
unequivocal constitutional text or judicial authority resolving them. 
None of the existing approaches to the status of customary international 
law satisfactorily resolve the questions that the subject raises. As 
discussed below, the modernist position ignores critical limitations on the 
scope of federal judicial authority, as well as the character of other rules 
of international law in the United States. As a result, this position produces 
an overbroad approach that is impossible to reconcile with either the 
treatment of treaties or the federal courts’ limited authority to make 
federal common law. This position is also impossible to reconcile with 
existing precedent, which has generally rejected the modernists’ 
expansive approach to judicial law-making authority, instead requiring a 
more nuanced inquiry into the intentions of the political branches and the 
content and character of particular rules of international law. 
Conversely, the revisionist position ignores federal authority over U.S. 
foreign relations and the importance of national uniformity in interpreting 
and espousing rules of customary international law. As a result, that 
approach also produces an overbroad rule that is impossible to reconcile 
with the Constitution’s allocation of authority over the Nation’s foreign 
relations. Moreover, the revisionist position is contradicted by judicial 
authority: in the post-Erie era, when the issue matters, U.S. courts 
consistently treat customary international law as federal law, subject to 
                                                     
65. Bellia & Clark, supra note 63, at 28, 37. The rationale for this approach is that the Framers and 
early federal judiciary adopted rules to safeguard the “perfect rights” of foreign states. Id. at 5–6. 
66. Id. at 62.  
67. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 154 (1795). 
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uniform interpretation by the federal courts. Similarly, the revisionists’ 
insistence on express, or comparably specific, political branch 
authorization for judicial application of international law is inconsistent 
with both the constitutional authority of those branches and existing 
precedent, in which courts have applied international law in a 
substantially broader set of circumstances. 
Other proposed approaches to the status of customary international law 
are also inconsistent with both constitutional text and structure and with 
judicial authority. They produce unprecedented forms of U.S. law, such 
as non-preemptive federal law, that are consistent with neither broad 
federal foreign relations authority nor with limited federal judicial 
authority. Not surprisingly, none of these approaches has been adopted by 
U.S. courts. 
Instead, the better approach adopts elements of both the modernist and 
revisionist positions, while rejecting other aspects of those positions. 
Under this approach, all rules of customary international law have the 
status of federal law, but only those rules of international law which the 
federal political branches have empowered U.S. courts to apply will be 
judicially applicable. This approach overcomes the deficiencies in both 
the modernist and revisionist positions, preserving federal authority over 
the Nation’s foreign relations while also respecting limits on unauthorized 
law-making by federal courts. 
Contrary to the modernist position, this approach ensures that rules of 
customary international law, like U.S. treaties, will be directly applicable 
in U.S. courts only if the U.S. political branches have so provided. 
Contrary to the revisionist position, however, this approach ensures that 
all rules of customary international law are rules of federal law, subject to 
uniform application and interpretation by federal courts. Moreover, also 
contrary to the revisionist position, this approach does not require express, 
or comparably specific, congressional authorization to apply customary 
international law. Instead, this approach looks to the character and content 
of the relevant international law rule, and other circumstances surrounding 
the U.S. political branches’ acceptance of that rule, applying factors 
paralleling those relevant to determining whether U.S. treaties are self-
executing. 
The approach proposed in this Article is the most sensible 
interpretation of the text, structure, and purposes of the Constitution and 
the most coherent explanation of existing judicial authority. Although the 
views of U.S. courts have varied over time, there is a relatively consistent 
theme to judicial applications of international law: U.S. courts have 
generally applied customary international law rules only after careful 
consideration of the extent to which the federal political branches have, in 
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some fashion, provided for such judicial application, exercising particular 
care to avoid judicial interference in the Nation’s foreign relations. In 
doing so, U.S. courts have in practice eschewed requirements for express 
political branch authorization and instead looked to a variety of 
considerations, paralleling the considerations that are relevant to 
determining whether a U.S. treaty is self-executing. As proposed in this 
Article, the same approach should be applicable to rules of customary 
international law. 
A. Constitutional Text, Structure, and Purposes 
The language, structure, and purposes of the Constitution do not 
support, and are instead inconsistent with, both the modern and revisionist 
positions. As detailed below, constitutional structure and objectives, as 
well as the Constitution’s text, provide decisive support for the view that 
all customary international law is federal law, but that particular rules of 
customary international law are directly applicable in U.S. courts only 
where the federal political branches have provided for such judicial 
application. 
1. Federal Foreign Relations Power 
The starting point for consideration of the status of customary 
international law in U.S. courts is the Constitution’s allocation of 
authority over U.S. foreign relations. Those provisions are familiar, and 
include the expansive grants of foreign relations authority to the 
Legislative and Executive branches in Articles I and II, including the 
power to raise armies and declare war;68 to regulate foreign commerce and 
immigration;69 to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of 
Nations;”70 to appoint and receive ambassadors and make Treaties;71 and 
to exercise executive authority as Commander-in-Chief.72 Conversely, the 
Constitution also (exceptionally) limits the authority of the states to 
undertake international legal obligations, providing in Article I that the 
states may not conclude treaties, alliances, compacts, or agreements with 
foreign states, grant letters of marque and reprisal, or wage war.73 
                                                     
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 14. 
69. Id. cls. 1, 3, 4. 
70. Id. cl. 10. 
71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II § 3, cl. 1. 
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation[, or] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . . No State shall, without the Consent of 
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It is non-controversial that these grants of authority provide the federal 
government with broad power over the Nation’s foreign relations, to 
ensure that national organs, representing national interests, will have 
authority over the Nation’s international affairs. In Madison’s words, “[i]f 
we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to 
other nations.”74 At a minimum, these provisions “reflect[] a concern for 
uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations and indicat[e] a 
desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of 
federal institutions.”75 More expansively, “in respect of our foreign 
relations generally, state lines disappear,”76 and “[p]ower over external 
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government 
exclusively.”77 Narrower formulations are also plausible, and periodically 
invoked,78 but on any view, the Constitution vests the federal government 
with uniquely broad and plenary authority over U.S. foreign affairs, 
particularly with respect to actions implicating the Nation’s international 
legal obligations (whether through “treaties,” “agreements and 
compacts,” or the “law of nations”).79 
It is against this background of constitutional text and structure that the 
revisionists’ claim that customary international law can be, and 
presumptively is, non-federal law must be assessed. The Constitution’s 
expansive grants of federal authority over the Nation’s foreign relations 
make that claim an exceedingly difficult one: the notion that each of the 
50 states is presumptively free to adopt and apply its own view as to the 
content of rules of customary international law is, at a minimum, in 
significant tension with the federal government’s broad affirmative 
authority over the Nation’s foreign relations and international legal 
obligations, as well as with the Constitution’s limitations on state 
authority in these fields. 
                                                     
Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or 
with a foreign Power . . . .”). 
74. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
75. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964). 
76. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); see also id. at 330 (“Governmental power 
over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government.”). 
77. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942). 
78.  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523–24 (2008); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 
419–20, 420 n.11 (2003).  
79. The importance of federal authority over the Nation’s international legal rights and obligations 
is evident from the Constitution’s focus on such issues, particularly in provisions addressing the 
power to make treaties and other international agreements, defining rules of customary international 
law (the Law of Nations), the power to declare war, and the power to recognize foreign states. See 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10, 11; U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.  
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The revisionist position also produces a host of deeply unsatisfactory 
results. It means, for example, that individual states would presumptively 
be free to adopt divergent views of foreign head-of-state immunity. To 
use familiar examples, under the logic of the revisionist position, the 
Queen of England or President of China would be subject to different rules 
of immunity in Massachusetts, Maine, and Maryland,80 as would U.K. and 
Chinese state officials and a number of foreign consuls and diplomats.81 
The same result would apply to a wide range of other issues not regulated 
by treaties or federal legislation, but subject to universally recognized 
rules of customary international law—including attribution of state 
responsibility,82 state succession,83 treatment of aliens,84 limits on 
                                                     
80. The United States is not party to any treaty regulating head of state immunity, and no statute 
addresses the subject. See Samantar v. Yousef, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010) (holding that the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act does not address head-of-state immunity). Accordingly, the treatment of 
foreign heads of state in the United States is subject, on an international plane, to customary 
international law. As others have observed, it is implausible to suggest that foreign heads of state 
would be entitled to different immunities in different states or to different immunity from that 
recognized by the federal Executive branch. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1838; Neuman, supra 
note 6, at 382–83. 
Some revisionists suggest that there may be grounds for concluding that the federal political 
branches have authorized judicial application of customary international law rules of head-of-state 
immunity. Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing Relevance, supra note 4, at 922–23; Bradley & 
Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 4, at 2160–67. As noted above, however, neither the FSIA nor other 
federal legislation, or international agreements, addresses the subject of head-of-state immunity. It is 
very difficult to conclude, therefore, that there has been federal political branch authorization of the 
character required by revisionist analysis (which, as discussed above, emphasizes the importance of 
congressional legislation, or a treaty, under Erie). See supra section I.B; infra section II.A.1; infra 
section III.A. 
81. The United States is party to treaties regarding diplomatic and consular immunity. Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. However, a 
number of states are not party to one (or both) of these treaties, and issues of diplomatic and consular 
immunity between these states and the United States are governed by customary international law. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 464–66. 
82. The United States is not party to any treaty generally prescribing rules for state responsibility. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 207. Issues of state responsibility affecting the United States (and other 
states) are subject, on an international plane, to customary international law, generally as reflected in 
the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. G.A. Res. 56/83, Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Jan. 28, 2002). 
83. The United States is not party to any treaty addressing state succession (including the Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties and Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 208–09. Accordingly, issues of state succession affecting 
the United States are subject, on an international plane, to customary international law.  
84. The United States is party to a number of treaties regarding the treatment of aliens (including 
foreign investors) RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 701, cmt. e. However, these treaties address only aspects 
of treatment of aliens and involve only some foreign states, leaving most aspects of the subject 
governed by customary international law. Id. at §§ 701–02. 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction,85 validity of U.S. (and non-U.S.) treaties,86 
law of the sea,87 and international environmental issues.88 Other examples 
can be readily identified.89 
In all of these cases, the logic of the revisionist position necessarily 
permits each of the fifty states to adopt different views as to the existence, 
contents, and judicial applicability of customary international law rules. 
A foreign head of state or other senior foreign official could be immune 
from suit (or arrest) in New York, but not New Jersey. A foreign state 
could be liable for actions of its agents in California, but not Arizona. A 
foreign (or U.S.) investor could be entitled to compensation under one 
state’s view of international law, but not another state’s. A treaty could be 
effective or applicable in one state, and not in another state.90 In each case, 
                                                     
85. The United States is not party to any treaty generally regulating extraterritorial exercises of 
legislative, judicial, or enforcement jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 401–16, 421–23, 
431–33. Accordingly, the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction by the United States (and other 
states) is subject, on an international plane, to customary international law. See id. 
86. The United States is not party to any treaty addressing issues regarding the status and legal 
effect of treaties, including issues of capacity, consent, reservations, entry into force, provisional 
application, pacta sunt servanda, retroactivity, and third-party rights. See generally, RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) pt. III.  
87. The United States is not party to any treaty generally regulating the law of the sea (as a 
consequence of the United States’s non-ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. V, Intro. Note. However, the Executive branch has declared that 
the Convention generally codifies customary international law. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF 
OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 
143 CHINA: MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 8 n.14 (2014).  
88. Most international environmental law is customary international law. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) §§ 601–04. 
89. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1850 (“[B]efore the U.S. ratification of the Genocide 
Convention, a federal judge, faced with the question whether to apply the rules against genocide in a 
civil tort suit, would have to predict whether the Supreme Court of Tennessee, for example, would 
incorporate the universal norm against genocide into Tennessee law.”). The revisionists’ observation 
that there are generally parallel U.S. constitutional or statutory protections is beside the point. The 
relevant inquiry is whether state positions on the international legal status of the rules prescribed by 
the Genocide Convention–or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or other 
comparable treaties–are binding on the federal courts and override the positions of the federal political 
branches (absent legislation or a treaty). The answer to those queries are plainly in the negative. 
90. The validity and applicability of a treaty is not governed by the terms of that treaty itself, but 
by general principles of customary international law, which determine when particular treaties will 
be valid and what they mean. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. III, Intro. Note; THE OXFORD GUIDE TO 
TREATIES 552, 557 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) (“Legal systems typically need rules to establish 
whether the norms prevailing in them are valid or invalid. . . . The only explicit validity rules 
circulating in the international legal order are the rules on . . . the invalidity of treaties, as laid down 
in Articles 46 to 53 of the [Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties].”). It would therefore be 
incorrect to suggest that the federal courts’ authority to interpret U.S. treaties as federal law (under 
Article VI) would provide federal courts the authority to resolve issues of treaty validity and 
applicability as matters of federal law. Those issues are determined, not by the terms of a U.S. treaty, 
but by external rules of law (specifically, customary international law). See supra note 86. Moreover, 
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individual state courts would be free to announce and apply divergent, and 
contradictory, views regarding the content of customary international law 
and, therefore, regarding the Nation’s international legal obligations.91 
Moreover, in each case, applying the revisionist view that customary 
international law is generally a matter of state law, binding on federal 
courts absent contrary federal legislation, Erie would also require federal 
courts to apply divergent state rules. That is because, as discussed above, 
under the revisionist position, both as generally stated and logically 
compelled, rules of customary international law are not federal law and, 
if adopted by a state, are state law, binding on federal courts under Erie.92 
The revisionist position would compel all of the foregoing results, not just 
in state courts, but in federal courts as well. 
The logic of the revisionist position would generally produce the 
foregoing results without regard to contrary Executive branch views, 
whether expressed in diplomatic correspondence, statements of policy, or 
before international organizations or tribunals. As long as Congress had 
not legislated (or the Senate has not ratified a treaty), federal courts would 
be forbidden from applying rules of customary international law as federal 
law, and would instead be bound to apply state court interpretations of 
international law. In the revisionists’ words, “[i]f a state chooses to 
                                                     
there is neither express nor implied statutory (or treaty) authorization for judicial application of these 
rules of customary international law. Indeed, with respect to some of these rules, not even the 
(unratified) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies the relevant customary international 
law rules. Under the logic of the revisionists’ position, state courts would therefore be free to reach 
independent conclusions regarding the customary international law rules of treaty validity, which 
would also be binding on federal courts under Erie. Indeed, the same conclusion would appear to 
apply to the interpretation of treaties to which the Unites States is not party (e.g., the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties) and, at least arguably, the interpretation of U.S. Treaties. Evan 
Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 431, 434 (2004). 
91. Indeed, it is difficult to see why the revisionist position would not, in the numerous areas where 
there has been no federal political branch authorization for judicial application of customary 
international law, permit state legislative enactments from adopting or incorporating asserted rules of 
international law, or state officials from participating in forums engaged in the formation of 
international law (such as UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, or the International Law Commission). 
92. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 870; supra section I.C; infra 
notes 97–102 and accompanying text. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith deny that the revisionist 
position treats customary international law as state law, instead contending that their position is only 
“that [customary international law] should not be a source of law for courts in the United States unless 
the appropriate sovereign—the federal political branches or the appropriate state entity—makes it 
so.” Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2260. That formulation does not alter the 
fundamental premise of the revisionist position, which is that, except in limited cases of federal 
political branch authorization for courts to apply customary international law, state courts and 
legislatures are free independently to interpret customary international law and to apply divergent and 
contradictory rules of international law.  
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incorporate [customary international law] into state law, then the federal 
courts would be bound to apply the state interpretation of [customary 
international law] on issues not otherwise governed by federal law.”93 
These results are impossible to reconcile with federal authority over the 
Nation’s foreign relations and or with the process by which the United 
States (like other countries) conducts its international relations.94 The 
revisionist position would prevent the federal political branches’ 
statements and actions regarding matters of customary international law, 
declaring the United States’s formal legal position and engaging the 
United States’s international legal responsibility, from being given effect 
in U.S. courts. Indeed, as discussed above, the revisionist position would 
require federal courts to apply rules of customary international law, 
adopted by individual states, that conflicted with the positions of the 
federal political branches. This result would place both state and federal 
courts, applying state law, in direct conflict with the political branches on 
a centrally important aspect of the Nation’s foreign relations—the 
interpretation and application of customary international law, governing 
the Nation’s conduct and international legal obligations vis-à-vis other 
states. That conflict is impossible to reconcile with the broad foreign 
affairs powers of the federal political branches. 
It is no answer to argue, as the revisionists do, that the federal political 
branches could conclude treaties or enact legislation to address particular 
issues of customary international law.95 That argument ignores the fact 
that, by design and necessity, many aspects of the Nation’s foreign 
relations are conducted in other, less formalized ways.96 Requiring the 
political branches to conclude treaties or enact legislation to deal with 
issues of customary international law would impede those branches’ 
ability to conduct foreign relations, limiting their flexibility and ignoring 
the fluidity inherent in international relations and in making international 
law. 
The reality is, and inevitably must be, that many of the United States’s 
positions regarding customary international law are expressed by informal 
communications or other actions of the political branches (such as 
                                                     
93. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 870; see supra section I.C; infra 
notes 97–102 and accompanying text.  
94. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1832 (“specter that multiple variants of the same international 
law rule could proliferate among the several states”); Neuman, supra note 6, at 376–77. 
95. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 819–20. 
96. See Paul F. Diehl, Charlotte Ku & Daniel Zamora, The Dynamics of International Law: The 
Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems, 57 INT’L ORG. 43 (2003); Charles Lipson, Why Are 
Some International Agreements Informal, 45 INT’L ORG. 495 (1991). 
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diplomatic notes or protests, submissions in international legal 
proceedings, and statements in international forums),97 which over time 
come to express the United States’s legal position and, in many cases, the 
content of customary international law.98 The revisionists’ rule would 
permit state courts (or legislation) to contradict the positions of the 
political branches, expressed in these ways—a result again impossible to 
reconcile with the broad foreign affairs powers of the federal political 
branches. 
The revisionist position is therefore in direct conflict with the need for 
the United States to speak with “one voice” on matters of international 
law. Although broader applications of the principle may be unjustified, a 
critical element of the political branches’ foreign relations power is the 
federal government’s ability to “speak for the Nation with one voice in 
dealing with other governments,”99 particularly regarding the content of 
international law and the United States’s international legal obligations.100 
This ensures that the interests of the Nation as a whole, in its international 
relations, will not be undermined or compromised by divergent or 
parochial positions of individual states.101 
Divergent state court (or legislative) interpretations of international law 
would compromise the federal political branches’ ability to speak with 
one voice on behalf of the Nation. In particular, state pronouncements on 
the content of rules of customary international law would undermine the 
credibility and weight of contrary federal positions on those same issues. 
                                                     
97. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (8th ed. 
2012); MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 17 (2d rev. ed. 2012). 
98. The process of the formation of rules of customary international law has been addressed 
extensively elsewhere. See K. WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 59–62 (2d ed. 
1993); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1975); 
Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General 
Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1988–1989).  
99. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000); see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (“At some point an exercise of state power that touches on 
foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy, given the ‘concern for uniformity 
in this country’s dealings with foreign nations’ that animated the Constitution’s allocation of the 
foreign relations power to the National Government in the first place.” (citing Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964))); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 
U.S. 434, 449 (1979); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) (“[T]he Federal 
Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign 
governments.”).  
100. See supra section II.A.1. 
101. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 
424 (“[I]t is plain that the problems involved [in the area of foreign relations] are uniquely federal in 
nature.”).  
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For example, declarations by the U.S. political branches that a particular 
rule had (or had not) achieved the status of customary international law 
would be undermined by state court decisions reaching the opposite 
conclusion, while political branch declarations denying (or asserting) the 
existence of opinio juris could be denied international effect by state court 
decisions reaching the opposite conclusion.102 As an amicus curiaae brief 
for the United States in a state court proceeding reasoned, arguing that 
customary international law was federal law: 
It is especially in areas not governed by precise treaty stipulations 
that “divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations” can 
most markedly affect the conduct of international relations. Were 
individual states free to formulate their own rules in such areas, 
the capacity of the United States to contribute with authority to 
the development of the international legal order would be greatly 
diminished . . . . The federal government cannot effectively 
invoke standards of international law to ensure continued 
favorable treatment by foreign governments for American 
governmental property abroad if these standards are not given 
effect by the political subdivisions of the United States.103 
The foregoing conclusions have particular force given the process by 
which customary international law is (and must be) formed, an issue that 
the revisionists largely ignore. As noted above, that process entails the 
evaluation of state practice with the objective of identifying “a general 
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.”104 
Importantly, one means of establishing the existence (or non-existence) 
of a rule of customary international law is “judgments and opinions of 
national judicial tribunals.”105 The actions of individual states and the 
decisions of state courts are attributable to and binding on the United 
States as a matter of international law.106 
                                                     
102. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424 (“If . . . state courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the 
purposes behind the doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had been no federal 
pronouncement on the subject.”). 
103. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 39–40, Republic of Argentina v. 
City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252 (1969). 
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(2). 
105. Id. § 103(2)(b); id. cmt. b. 
106. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1876) (“Upon whom would such a claim be 
made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our Constitution, she can hold no exterior relations 
with other nations. It would be made upon the government of the United States.”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) § 207 reporters’ note 3 (“The United States has consistently accepted international 
responsibility for actions or omissions of its constituent States and has insisted upon similar 
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As a consequence, state court decisions adopting particular views of 
customary international law do not merely involve the risk of committing 
violations of international law or undermining U.S. government positions, 
but also entail the individual states’ direct participation in the formation 
of rules of international law, binding the entire Nation.107 This 
participation would include contributing to formation of a rule of 
international law108 on which the federal government has not yet taken a 
position or may oppose. Once that rule is established, the United States 
might well be bound as a matter of international law, regardless of 
subsequent contrary views of the federal government.109 Alternatively, 
state court decisions could undercut the formation of a rule of 
international law that the federal government supported, by denying the 
rule’s existence. In all of these cases, categorizing customary international 
law as state law produces unacceptable results with the potential seriously 
to undermine the federal political branches’ role in creating and applying 
international law. 
To take another familiar example,110 Oregon or California courts could 
hold that customary international law forbids capital punishment, or 
provides a claim in tort to recover damages for certain types of 
environmental pollution, or guarantees asylum to certain aliens; at the 
same time, South Carolina courts would be free to hold the opposite, 
rejecting arguments that international law forbids capital punishment or 
allows claims for environmental pollution or asylum. Both sets of 
holdings would, under the logic of the revisionist position, be matters of 
state law, with no possibility of U.S. Supreme Court review. In these 
circumstances, both sets of state court holdings could materially affect the 
                                                     
responsibility on the part of the national governments of other federal states.”). 
107. See PITT COBBETT, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 103–05 (Hugh Bellot ed., 4th ed. 1921) (citing 
Massachusetts decision to establish content of customary international law); Michael Wood (Special 
Rapporteur), Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014) (“[A]ccount has to be taken of all available practice of a particular 
State. . . . This may be particularly likely with the practice of sub-State organs (for example, in a 
federal State).”); id. ¶¶ 34, 37; Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special 
Rapporteur, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 62, ¶ 62 (April 29) (“According to a well-established 
rule of international law, the conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded as an act of that State.”). 
108. See K. WOLFKE, supra note 98, at 73 (“[I]t is a truism to say that a judicial organ ascertaining 
customs to some extent creates them.”). 
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102(4), 207 reporters’ note 3; ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE 
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1971) (custom “is generally regarded as having 
universal application, whether or not any given state participated in its formation or later ‘consented’ 
to it”).  
110. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 349–51; Brilmayer, supra note 3, 
at 322–29; Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 382–84, 474–79. 
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international legal position of the United States, potentially binding the 
Nation to whichever state court first expressed its position, while also 
having more general effects on the weight and credibility of contrary 
federal positions.111 All of this would seriously undermine the conduct of 
U.S. foreign relations and the United States’s participation in the 
development of international law. 
The revisionist position is also very difficult to reconcile with Article 
I’s express (and exceptional) denial of state authority to conclude treaties, 
compacts, or agreements with foreign states.112 Although Article I, section 
8 does not refer expressly to customary international law, all of the state 
actions that it does refer to are closely analogous to direct state 
participation in the making of customary international law through state 
judicial decisions on issues of international law. Each type of state action 
referred to in Article I involves the formation of international legal 
obligations, on the basis of state consent,113 and result in the responsibility 
of the entire United States.114 Given this, and the lack of clear textual 
direction or evidence of intent in Article I, section 8,115 it is very difficult 
to see why constitutional prohibitions against the making of international 
agreements by states do not apply with equal force to state interpretations 
and applications of customary international law.116 
                                                     
111. See Wood, supra note 107, ¶ 50 (“[I]t may be necessary to look cautiously at that practice . . . 
[w]here a State speaks in several voices, its practice is ambivalent, and such conflict may well weaken 
the weight to be given to the practice concerned.”); id. ¶ 79. 
112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
113. See supra section II.A.1. 
114. See supra section II.A.1. 
115. It is unclear what precise meaning the Framers attributed to the terms “treaty,” “agreement,” 
and “compact.” See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 463 (1978) (“Whatever 
distinct meanings the Framers attributed to the terms in Art. I, § 10, those meanings were soon lost.”); 
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893); Abraham C. Weinfeld, Comment, What Did the 
Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by “Agreements or Compacts”?, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 
457 (1936). As a consequence, the Supreme Court has looked to the purposes and consequences of 
particular arrangements in applying Article I. See U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 463. From that 
perspective, the same concerns that underlie the conclusion of international “agreements” by states 
also apply to the states’ participation in the formation of customary international law. See also JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 668 (Ronald D. Rotunda 
and John E. Nowak, eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (by virtue of Article I’s prohibitions 
against actions by states, “[u]niformity is thus secured in all operations which relate to foreign powers; 
and an immediate responsibility to the nation on the part of those for whose conduct the nation is 
itself responsible”).  
116. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 380 (2000) (state law 
restricting purchases of goods from companies conducting business in Burma intrudes on federal 
foreign affairs authority); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432–36 (1968) (state inheritance statute 
intrudes on federal foreign affairs authority); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1886) 
(state’s extradition to foreign nation intrudes on federal foreign affairs authority).The revisionists 
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It was for these reasons that, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
the Supreme Court endorsed Judge Jessup’s “caution[] that rules of 
international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial 
state interpretations,” and declared that this “basic rationale is equally 
applicable to the act of state doctrine.”117 The Court’s language could not 
have been more clear in characterizing customary international law as 
federal law. It is, of course, true that the Court went on to refuse to directly 
apply customary international law rules against uncompensated 
expropriations in Sabbatino.118 But that refusal has nothing to do with the 
Court’s prior observation that rules of international law could not be 
governed by “divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations,”119 or 
the Court’s explicit approval of Judge Jessup’s categorization of 
customary international law as federal law. Rather, that refusal concerns 
only the separate issue, discussed below, of the existence of political 
branch authorization for direct judicial application of particular rules of 
customary international law by U.S. courts.120 
As discussed above, the foregoing conclusions have particular force 
because the actions of individual states are, as a matter of international 
law, attributable to and binding upon the United States.121 Where the 
United States as a whole is responsible for, and bound by, the actions of 
individual states applying customary international law, it is implausible to 
conclude that the states are free to adopt divergent, conflicting 
interpretations of international law (with those views being binding on the 
federal courts). Rather, as Sabbatino concluded, the United States’s 
ultimate responsibility for interpretations of customary international law 
necessarily requires federal judicial authority over such interpretations.122 
                                                     
observe, correctly, that Article I, section 8, omits reference to customary international law (or the law 
of nations), although other provisions of the Constitution contain such references, and conclude that 
state participation in the making of customary international law is therefore not prohibited. See 
Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 862–63. That analysis fails to account for 
Article I, section 8’s notorious lack of clarity or the purposes of section 8’s prohibition against 
independent state action. See supra note 115.  
117. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (emphasis added). Justice 
White’s dissenting opinion agreed that rules of customary international law were federal law. Id. at 
451 (White, J., dissenting).  
118. See infra section II.B.1. 
119. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425. 
120. See infra section II.A.1; infra section II.A.2.  
121. See supra section II.A.1. 
122. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (M. Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1937) (“[N]o part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring [international complaints] on the 
whole.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (“[T]he 
peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The union will undoubtedly be 
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Importantly, federal law governs both the content of rules of customary 
international law and the question whether such rules of international law 
are directly applicable in U.S. courts. It is essential to the federal foreign 
affairs power that federal courts, applying uniform federal law, determine 
whether a particular rule of customary international law exists, what its 
content is, and whether U.S. courts have been authorized by the federal 
political branches to apply that rule. With respect to this final question, 
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Sabbatino, articulating a rule governing 
whether international law rules regarding expropriation were applicable 
in U.S. courts, is directly relevant: “an issue concerned with a basic choice 
regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National 
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the 
international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of 
federal law.”123 
The foregoing conclusions are confirmed by U.S. courts’ treatment of 
international law in other contexts. For example, it is clear that, under the 
Charming Betsy presumption (requiring interpretation of federal 
legislation consistently with international law),124 the relevant rules of 
international law are ascertained as a matter of federal law: the effects of 
the Charming Betsy presumption on the meaning of federal legislation do 
not vary from state to state, as they necessarily would if international law 
were generally a matter of state law.125 The same is true of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, based in substantial part on rules 
                                                     
answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 281 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasizing “the advantage of uniformity in all points 
which relate to foreign powers”).  
123. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425. As discussed below, this is precisely how U.S. treaties are treated: 
the question whether a treaty’s provisions are self-executing is a question of federal (not state) law. 
See infra section II.A.2.  
124. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 114; see also Bradley, Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 
4, at 482. 
125. Some revisionists argue that the Charming Betsy presumption is a rule of federal common law 
and that this implies incorporation of uniform federal rules of customary international law. See 
Bradley, Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 4, at 534; Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing 
Relevance, supra note 4, at 921. That explanation is unpersuasive: the fact that the Charming Betsy 
presumption is a rule of federal law does not mean that the rules of international law incorporated by 
the Charming Betsy canon are also federal law. Federal law looks routinely to state law in similar 
circumstances. See, e.g., Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (under section 1983, “in several 
respects . . . federal law looks to the law of the State in which the cause of action arose”); Kamen v. 
Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (“[C]ourts should incorporate state law when 
fashioning federal common law rules.”). If, as the revisionists contend, customary international law 
does not have the status of federal common law, then it is very difficult to see how the Charming 
Betsy presumption would incorporate such (non-existent) rules of federal law. 
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of customary international law;126 again, the presumption is applicable 
uniformly in all American courts to determine the scope of federal 
legislation, regardless of state court views about the precise scope of 
jurisdictional limitations imposed by international law. In each case, it is 
both settled and obvious that the rules of international law applicable in 
U.S. courts are uniform rules of federal, not state, law. 
Some revisionist analyses suggest that judicial application of a few 
rules of customary international law may be regarded as having been 
authorized by independent Executive branch action, including rules 
regarding treaty interpretation127 and foreign sovereign immunity.128 
These suggestions have generally been guarded,129 and are contrary to 
prior revisionist positions (which required legislation or treaty provisions 
expressly incorporating international law).130 These suggestions are also 
difficult to reconcile with the centerpiece of revisionist analysis —that, 
after Erie, customary international law cannot be “a source of law for 
courts in the United States unless the appropriate sovereign — the federal 
political branches or the appropriate state entity — makes it so.”131 
                                                     
126. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (“This 
rule of construction reflects principles of customary international law . . . .”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he practice of using international 
law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence.”); Gary 
Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 8–9 
(1992).  
127. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing Relevance, supra note 4, at 921–22. These 
analyses have suggested that the (unratified) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could provide 
“gap-filling” rules for interpretation of treaties, which might be applied as federal common law, 
apparently relying on Executive branch authorization. Id. As discussed below, this position is very 
difficult to reconcile with earlier revisionist positions or with the revisionists’ emphasis on legislative 
law-making authority under Erie. See supra section I.A; infra section II.A.2; infra section III.A. 
128. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing Relevance, supra note 4, at 922–23. These 
analyses have suggested that Executive branch suggestions of immunity prior to enactment of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provided a basis for judicial development of rules of federal 
common law. Again, these suggestions are difficult to reconcile with the logic of the revisionist 
position. 
129. See id. at 922 (“Sometimes, courts look to principles of CIL as embodied in the Vienna 
Convention . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 924 (“[C]ourts are looking, at least to some degree, for 
political branch authorization.”) (emphasis added); Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 
4, at 2269–70 (“The head-of-state immunity example illustrates that in some cases there will be 
plausible arguments for and against the requisite political branch authorization . . . .”) (emphasis 
added).  
130. See supra section I.B; supra note 41.  
131. Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2260; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Human Rights, supra note 4, at 345 (“[J]udicial federalization of CIL without political branch 
authorization is inconsistent with American constitutional democracy,” in part, because it applies a 
“law against states by federal courts without the filter of constitutional or legislative authorization.”); 
Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 857 (treating customary international law 
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Moreover, the logic of these suggestions would open the door to much 
broader incorporation of customary international law as federal law, based 
entirely on Executive branch action, than that promised by revisionist 
analysis more generally.132 
Most fundamentally, however, even accepting these suggestions, the 
revisionist position would continue to treat very substantial portions of the 
corpus of customary international law as non-federal law. That is obvious 
from the Constitution’s limits on Executive branch authority,133 and is 
explicit in revisionist analysis: “[t]he term ‘customary international law’ 
subsumes a variety of different norms, only some of which the political 
branches want to federalize.”134 Thus, under the revisionist analysis, states 
remain free to adopt divergent positions with respect to both the content 
of the customary international law rules in these fields, whatever they may 
be, and the applicability of such rules in U.S. courts. As discussed above, 
and assuming no political branch authorization, Oregon and South 
Carolina courts would remain free to reach different conclusions 
regarding the content and applicability of customary international law in 
U.S. courts, including on issues such as capital punishment, 
environmental torts, and asylum. These results are impossible to reconcile 
with federal authority over U.S. foreign affairs and the necessity that the 
Nation speak with one voice about the content of customary international 
law and U.S. international legal obligations.135 
                                                     
as federal common law is “in tension with basic notions of American representative democracy” 
because “it is not applying law generated by the U.S. lawmaking processes,” but rather “law derived 
from the views and practices of the international community”). 
132. Relatedly, the specific examples of Executive branch authorization suggested by some 
revisionist analysis are difficult to characterize as involving any meaningful acts of political branch 
authorization for U.S. courts to apply such rules. Thus, there is no indication of any such actions with 
regard to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (which, instead, the Senate has refused to 
ratify). See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1839–40. Similarly, judicial application of rules of 
foreign sovereign, consular, diplomatic, head-of-state and official immunity routinely occurred in the 
absence of Executive branch suggestions of immunity (much less legislative authorization); although 
Executive suggestions of immunity were sometimes treated as conclusive by U.S. courts, the decisive 
point is that, even in the absence of such Executive branch suggestions, courts directly applied 
customary international law. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1945) 
(“[C]ourts may decide for themselves whether all the requisites of [foreign sovereign] immunity 
exist.”); Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 770–77 (4th Cir. 2012) (head-of-state and official act 
immunity). Thus, in neither of these categories is there meaningful evidence of actions by the federal 
political branches to authorize judicial application of customary international law rules. 
133. See infra section II.A.2. 
134. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2270. 
135. Ironically, many statements of the modern position produce the same (unacceptable) results. 
Most modernists would not treat all customary international law rules as federal common law, instead 
requiring some sort of heightened showing of specificity. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1835 
(“Once customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should presumptively incorporate them 
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It is no answer to object to “unelected federal judges apply[ing] 
customary [international] law made by the world community at the 
expense of state prerogatives . . . [where] the interests of the states are 
neither formally nor effectively represented in the lawmaking process.”136 
The relevant question is whose interests and lawmaking processes must 
prevail in the formation and judicial application of customary 
international law—those of individual states and their citizens or the 
United States and its citizens. The answer is straightforward: federal 
judges, selected by the federal government,137 applying uniform federal 
law, ultimately reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court, plainly must 
prevail on issues of customary international law, binding the Nation and 
directly impacting its foreign relations.138 And when the President and 
Congress participate in the selection of federal judges and in the formation 
of customary international law, then the interests of the states—all of the 
states—have been both “formally [and] effectively represented in the 
lawmaking process” of customary international law.139 
It is also no answer to object that “[customary international law] was 
not viewed as federal law during most of our nation’s history.”140 It is non-
controversial141 that, prior to the “avulsive” changes produced by Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins, customary international law was “general common 
law”—which was neither state nor federal in character.142 As the 
revisionists usually acknowledge,143 pre-Erie authority is therefore of 
limited value in determining the status of customary international law in 
                                                     
into federal common law.”) (emphasis added); Neuman, supra note 6, at 387–88 (requiring a “genuine 
norm of customary international law,” not “emerging norms”). As a consequence, “insufficiently 
crystallized” rules or “emerging norms” of international law would be state law under the modernist 
analysis—leading to the same ills as those produced by the revisionist position. See supra section 
II.A.1. 
136. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 868.  
137. There is little question that with regard to their selection, experience, and institutional 
structure, federal courts are better situated to decide issues of international law than state courts. Koh, 
State Law?, supra note 6, at 1849 (“[F]ederal judges have structural attributes that make them more 
appropriate adjudicators to rule on international matters.”). 
138. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (quoted infra, note 212); Koh, State 
Law?, supra note 6, at 1853 n.163 (“Bradley and Goldsmith’s proposal would also allow unelected 
federal and state judges to construe customary international law, but as some species of state law.”). 
139. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 868. 
140. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 332. 
141. Contrary suggestions are plainly untenable. Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and 
Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 308–09 (1999). 
142. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 824; Young, Sorting Out, supra 
note 19, at 374–75.  
143. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 849. 
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a post-Erie legal system. The more relevant inquiry is what the text, 
structure, and purposes of the Constitution require, and as discussed 
above, those sources require treating customary international law as 
federal law. 
In any event, prior to Erie, customary international law was regarded 
as general common law, not as state law. Simply re-characterizing 
customary international law as state law because it was not previously 
federal law is a non sequitur. Erie raises, but does not resolve, the question 
of how rules of general common law should be categorized—as state law 
or federal law—in a system which requires a choice. The answer to that 
question is, again, provided by the federal foreign relations powers, 
requiring that international law be treated as federal, not state, law.144 That 
answer is confirmed by post-Erie judicial authority, discussed below, 
holding consistently that rules of international law, and their status in the 
U.S. courts, are matters of federal law.145 
Finally, suggestions that customary international law should be 
regarded as “non-preemptive federal law,” “non-preemptive non-federal 
law,” or “general common law”146 are also untenable. All of these 
alternatives are even less consistent with expansive federal foreign 
relations authority than the revisionist position. Indeed, these alternatives 
make it even more difficult for the United States to speak with one 
voice,147 while simultaneously creating novel categories of law that 
resurrect the risks of different results in state and federal courts that Erie 
sought to prevent. These results are incompatible with both the federal 
foreign affairs power and the Article VI Supremacy Clause, and are even 
less plausible than the revisionist position.148 
                                                     
144. That answer is supported by the fact that, in pre-Erie America, the general common law had 
an important unifying function: “[t]he ‘general common law’ had provided a coordinating concept 
that linked [the federal and state judicial] systems in a joint interpretive enterprise.” Neuman, supra 
note 6, at 378; see infra section II.B.2; infra note 333.  
145. See infra section II.B.1; infra section II.B.2. 
146. See Aleinikoff, supra note 61, at 97; Ramsey, International Law, supra note 59, at 558; 
Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 502–03.  
147. They do so by adding an additional voice (federal courts) to the fifty (state court) voices under 
the revisionist position.  
148. Other commentators have argued that the Constitution itself authorizes federal courts to make 
federal common law in order to safeguard the federal political branches’ foreign relations authority. 
Bellia & Clark, supra note 63, at 7. In order to cabin this position, however, its proponents postulate 
that the Framers and U.S. courts sought only to safeguard the “perfect rights” of foreign states, as a 
means of avoiding interference with the powers to declare war and recognize foreign states. The 
absence of any evidence of attention by nineteenth century U.S. courts to the concept of “perfect 
rights,” coupled with the breadth and uncertainty of the concept, present insurmountable obstacles for 
this thesis. It does, however, usefully emphasize the breadth of the political branches’ foreign relations 
authority.  
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2. Separation of Powers 
The characterization of all rules of customary international law as 
federal law does not conclude inquiry into the status of these rules in U.S. 
courts. Rather, it is also necessary separately to consider whether, on the 
one hand, the federal political branches have provided for U.S. courts to 
apply particular rules of customary international law or, whether, on the 
other hand, the U.S. political branches intended, in accepting such a rule, 
that it operate only internationally, requiring subsequent domestic 
implementation in the United States by Congress (or otherwise) before it 
could be judicially applicable by U.S. courts. This analysis gives effect to 
Erie’s prohibition against unauthorized judicial law-making and parallels 
the approach applicable to other international legal obligations to which 
the U.S. political branches subject the United States by way of treaties or 
other international agreements; as discussed below, the approach 
applicable to U.S. treaties applies with equal force to customary 
international law. 
Article VI of the Constitution provides that U.S. treaties are federal 
law, the “supreme Law of the Land,” which prevails over inconsistent 
state law.149 Nonetheless, despite that text and the status of treaties as 
federal law, it has been clear from the early days of the Republic that 
particular provisions of U.S. treaties will only be directly applicable in 
U.S. courts if they are “self-executing.”150 More specifically, a treaty 
provision will be given effect in U.S. courts if the political branches—in 
particular, the President and Senate—intended that the provision 
“operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.”151 On the 
other hand, if the political branches intend the treaty provision to “import 
a contract,” then the provision “addresses itself to the political, not the 
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before 
it can become a rule for the Court.”152 
The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties 
was articulated in the first U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning U.S. 
                                                     
149. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any [t]hing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
150. The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties was recognized from 
the earliest days of the Republic. Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 393, 403–04 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
1788). 
151. Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829). 
152. Id. at 314.  
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treaties. In Ware v. Hylton,153 the Court considered whether a provision of 
the Treaty of Paris applied directly in a U.S. judicial proceeding to 
invalidate a state law that nullified debts to British subjects. Justice Chase 
reasoned that, notwithstanding the text of Article VI, “[n]o one can doubt 
that a treaty may stipulate, that certain acts shall be done by the 
Legislature; that other acts shall be done by the Executive; and others by 
the Judiciary.”154 The Court continued: 
When . . . a treaty stipulates for any thing of a legislative nature, 
the manner of giving effect to this stipulation is by that power 
which possesses the Legislative authority, and which 
consequently is authorized to prescribe laws to the people for their 
obedience, passing such laws as the public obligation requires.155 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the relevant treaty provision was 
addressed to the courts, not to Congress, and that the provision therefore 
applied directly to preempt otherwise applicable state law.156 
The Court adopted the same distinction between self-executing and 
non-self-executing treaties in Foster v. Neilson.157 Citing Article VI, the 
Court observed that the “constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the 
land,”158 and therefore federal law, directly applicable in U.S. courts. But 
Chief Justice Marshall also qualified that observation, holding that a treaty 
is “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the 
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative 
provision.”159 And the Court went on, following the analysis in Ware v. 
Hylton, to hold that, “when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, 
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty 
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the 
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the 
Court.”160 
This distinction between self-executing treaties, addressed to the 
judiciary, and non-self-executing treaties, addressed to the political 
                                                     
153. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
154. Id. at 244. 
155. Id. at 272.  
156. Id. at 244–45. 
157. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
158. Id. at 254. 
159. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).  
160. Id. (emphasis added). The Court noted that the treaty “seems to be the language of contract; 
and if it is, the ratification and confirmation which are promised must be the act of the legislature. 
Until such act shall be passed, the Court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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branches, was applied throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries,161 and adopted without controversy in the Restatements of 
Foreign Relations Law.162 According to the Third Restatement, “a ‘non-
self-executing’ agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence 
of necessary implementation.”163 Or, as the Supreme Court recently 
summarized, “[t]his Court has long recognized the distinction between 
treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that—
while they constitute international law commitments—do not by 
themselves function as binding federal law.”164 
As the text of the Third Restatement suggests, the distinction between 
self-executing and non-self-executing provisions applies equally to 
treaties and other international agreements concluded by the United 
                                                     
161. See, e.g., The Five Percent Discount Cases, 243 U.S. 97, 105 (1917) (applying the distinction); 
De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267–68, 273 (1890) (applying the distinction); Whitney v. 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“If the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing, 
that is, require no legislation to make them operative . . . they [will] have the force and effect of a 
legislative enactment.”); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 410–11, 429–30 (1886) (applying 
the distinction); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884) (“A treaty, then, is a law of 
the land as an act of [C]ongress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the 
private citizen or subject may be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in 
a court of justice, [courts must] resor[t] to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it 
would to a statute.”); Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (applying 
the distinction).  
162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 111(3), (4); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND)]; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 
TREATIES § 106 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft, 2015) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
(FOURTH)]. 
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(3).  
164. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008). Even if a treaty is non-self-executing, it 
nonetheless constitutes federal law under the Supremacy Clause. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 203–04 (2d ed. 1996); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-
Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 174 [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Duality]. 
Some recent commentary argues that the Framers did not intend to allow non-self-executing treaties. 
See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 764 (1988); Carlos Manual 
Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1113–14 
(1992). That view is inconsistent with long-established judicial authority and practice, fundamental 
to the contemporary conduct of U.S. foreign relations, see supra section II.A.2, and is logically 
untenable: consider a treaty provision obligating each contracting state to “enact legislation providing 
for the protection of intellectual property rights” or to “adopt regulations for the free movement of 
persons between the contracting states.” Provisions of this character are inevitably non-self-executing. 
See Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 393, 403 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1788) (interpreting Treaty of 
Peace with Britain providing “Congress shall recommend it to the Several Legislatures to provide for 
such a restitution; and, as to those of another description, they have liberty given them by the treaty . . . 
and Congress is to recommend to the States, that they be restored on refunding the money paid for 
[the estates]”).  
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States.165 It is, of course, well-settled that the federal political branches 
possess the constitutional authority to conclude international agreements 
in forms other than treaties.166 Thus, provisions of both congressional-
executive agreements167 and sole executive agreements168 have repeatedly 
been held directly applicable in U.S. courts, and given effect 
notwithstanding contrary provisions of state law. Most recently, in 
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi,169 the Supreme Court 
commented that sole executive agreements are generally “fit to pre-empt 
state law, just as treaties are,” and held that a specific sole executive 
agreement was directly applicable in U.S. courts, superseding rights that 
would otherwise exist under U.S. state law.170 
                                                     
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(3).  
166. See id. § 303. Again, some recent commentary argues that the Framers did not intend to permit 
sole executive or congressional-executive agreements. See RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT, 
supra note 59, at 174–75, 186–93 (2007) (describing various kinds of “non-treaty agreements”); 
Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1581–90 (2007) 
[hereinafter Clark, Sole Executive Agreements]; Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure 
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1221 (1995). That view is again inconsistent with 200 years of practice and nearly a century of judicial 
authority. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (“While th[e] rule in respect of 
treaties is established by the express language of clause 2, article 6, of the Constitution, the same rule 
would result in the case of all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete 
power over international affairs is in the national government.”); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, at 496 n.163 (“Presidents from Washington 
to Clinton have made many thousands of agreements . . . on matters running the gamut of U.S. foreign 
relations.”); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 
(1995). 
167. B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912) (approving congressional-executive 
agreement). Cf. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931) (upholding validity of international 
agreement approved by Senate super-majority, not denominated as a treaty); Gross v. German Found. 
Indus. Initiative, 549 F.3d 605, 611–13 (3d Cir. 2008) (considering whether Joint Statement of Berlin 
Accords, which “is not a formal treaty,” is self-executing). 
168. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223, 230 (1942) (“‘[A]ll international compacts and 
agreements’ are to be treated with similar dignity [to treaties under Article VI’s Supremacy Clause] 
for the reason that ‘complete power over international affairs is in the national government. . . . A 
treaty is a ‘Law of the Land’ under the supremacy clause . . . . Such international compacts and 
agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity.”); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 (“[W]hile 
this rule [i.e., supremacy over prior law] in respect of treaties is established by the express language 
of cl. 2, Art. VI, of the Constitution, the same rule would result in the case of all international compacts 
and agreements.”); Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 294 (1870) (“Such conventions are not 
treaties within the meaning of the constitution, and, as treaties, supreme law of the land, conclusive 
on the courts, but they are provisional arrangements . . . [which are] for the occasion an expression of 
the will of the people through their political organ, touching the matters affected; and to avoid 
unhappy collision between the political and judicial branches . . . such an expression to a reasonable 
limit should be followed by the courts and not opposed, though extending to the temporary restraint 
or modification of the operation of an existing statute.”). 
169. 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
170. Id. at 416, 419–20, 419 n.11; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United 
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U.S. courts have looked to a variety of factors to determine whether 
particular treaties or other international agreements171 were intended by 
the U.S. political branches to be self-executing.172 These factors include 
statements in the agreement indicating its status,173 the character of the 
agreement and content of the rights it conferred,174 statements in the U.S. 
negotiating or ratification process,175 the character and content of related 
international agreements,176 and the post-ratification views and conduct of 
the United States.177 These factors have produced a variety of results, with 
some agreements and some provisions of agreements treated as self-
executing, and others as non-self-executing.178 
The approach that applies to treaties (and congressional-executive and 
sole executive agreements) under Article VI should also apply to 
customary international law. There is, of course, no express textual basis 
for such a result (because Article VI refers only to “Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]” and 
“Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States,” and not to customary international law).179 But that has not 
prevented congressional-executive and sole executive agreements, which 
are also absent from Article VI’s text, from being treated in the same 
                                                     
States v. Kelly, 676 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he purposes of the treaty and the objectives of 
its creators . . . . is the factor that is critical to determine whether an executive agreement is self 
executing . . . .” (emphasis added, omissions in original)); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 35 n.17 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“a congressional-executive agreement, the language of 
which made the agreement self-executing” is “domestic U.S. law”).  
171. Some provisions of a treaty may be self-executing even if others are not. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) § 111 cmt. h. 
172. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–18 (2008); Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373 
(7th Cir. 1985) (“[C]ourts consider several factors in discerning the intent of the parties to the 
agreement: (1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances 
surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the 
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting 
a private right of action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 5; Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 164, at 149.  
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(4)(a); see Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504–05. 
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 5 (“[p]rovisions in treaties of friendship, 
commerce, and navigation . . . conferring rights on foreign nationals”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(FOURTH) § 106 reporters’ note 2 (“Courts also have been more likely to find self-execution when 
treaty provisions address matters of individual or private rights as opposed to the rights of the state.”). 
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(4)(b); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 106 reporters’ 
note 2.  
176. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517–18 (2008). 
177. See id. at 506–07. 
178. See Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 600–30 (2007) (categorizing Supreme 
Court decisions regarding self-executing status of treaties). 
179. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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manner as treaties for purposes of Article VI.180 The same conclusions 
apply to rules of customary international law to which the U.S. political 
branches have subjected the United States; that is true notwithstanding the 
status of all customary international law rules as federal law.181 The basis 
for the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties—that the political branches may not intend to make international 
obligations that they have undertaken applicable directly in U.S. courts, 
notwithstanding their status as federal law—is at least equally applicable 
to customary international law rules. Like some treaty obligations, many 
rules of customary international law are plainly not intended for direct 
application in national courts. International law rules regarding the use of 
force and protection of the environment are obvious examples.182 It would 
make no sense to conclude that the U.S. political branches intended these 
rules to be automatically applicable in U.S. courts. 
Indeed, if a formal written treaty, negotiated by the President and 
approved by the Senate, must be examined in order to determine whether 
the political branches intended it to be self-executing, it is impossible to 
see why customary international law, not involving any equivalent written 
instrument, individualized negotiations, or Senate approval, should not be 
subject to the same inquiry. Moreover, in practice, customary 
international law rules are also characterized by substantially less clarity 
and precision than treaty provisions,183 again, arguing for care in treating 
                                                     
180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 303; supra section II.A.2. 
181. The Third Restatement devotes no attention to the question whether customary international 
law is directly applicable in U.S. courts. It provides, in section 111(3), that U.S. courts “are bound to 
give effect to international law and to international agreements of the United States,” except for “non-
self-executing” agreements. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(3). No similar exception is included in 
section 111 for “non-self-executing” rules of customary international law. Comment d recites that 
rules of customary international law “while not mentioned explicitly in the Supremacy Clause, are 
also federal law and as such are supreme over State law.” Id. cmt. d. Comment h then addresses “self-
executing and non-self-executing international agreements” without reference to customary 
international law. Id. cmt. h. The Restatement makes no effort to explain the differential treatment of 
customary and conventional international law. 
182. See CRAWFORD, supra note 97, at 69 (“A rule . . . of a strictly interstate character . . . may be 
difficult to restructure as a norm within a domestic legal system, aside from cases where the common 
law has transposed the various state immunities directly from international law.”). 
183. As Justice Cardozo put it, “[i]nternational law . . . has at times, like the common law within 
states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or justice.” New 
Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934). See D’AMATO, supra note 109, at 4 (“The questions 
of how custom comes into being and how it can be change or modified are wrapped in mystery and 
illogic.”); G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1983) (“The 
views represented in doctrine provide a kaleidoscopic picture ranging from one extreme to the 
other.”); WOLFKE, supra note 98, at 4–5. 
Some customary international law principles are particularly ill-suited for judicial application. See 
Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, ¶ 
04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2017  9:45 AM 
2017] CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS 1679 
 
such rules as directly applicable in U.S. courts. Given these 
considerations, an inquiry into the self-executing status of customary 
international law rules is more, not less, appropriate than it is for treaties 
and other international agreements. 
Despite this, the modern position is that all rules of customary 
international law are presumptively self-executing and applicable in U.S. 
courts. That is the rule prescribed by the Third Restatement,184 as well as 
by proponents of the modern position: “[i]nternational law . . . is ‘self-
executing’ and is applied by courts in the United States without any need 
for it to be enacted or implemented by Congress.”185 As already discussed, 
however, this position is impossible to reconcile with the treatment of 
other forms of international law in the United States or with the character 
of customary international law; rather, like treaties, particular rules of 
customary international law must be examined to determine whether they 
are self-executing and directly applicable in U.S. courts. 
Federal judicial application of customary international law rules, 
without political branch direction, is also inconsistent with constitutional 
text and structure. Article I contains the Constitution’s most relevant 
reference to customary international law, granting Congress the power to 
“define and punish . . . [o]ffenses against the Law of Nations.”186 
Likewise, Article III grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising 
under “Laws” and “Treaties” of the United States, but not customary 
international law,187 and Article VI provides that “Laws” and “Treaties” 
of the United States, but not customary international law, are the supreme 
Law of the Land.188 
These provisions do not support, and are instead in tension with, the 
modernist claim that federal courts are presumptively empowered to apply 
                                                     
111 (Oct. 12) (“A body of detailed rules is not to be looked for in customary international law which 
in fact comprises a limited set of norms for ensuring the co-existence and vital co-operation of the 
members of the international community, together with a set of customary rules whose presence in 
the opinio juris of States can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a sufficiently extensive 
and convincing practice . . . .”). The need for inquiry into political branch authorization of judicial 
application is particularly appropriate in these circumstances. 
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 111(1), (3).  
185. Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note 20, at 1561; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, 
International Law, supra note 4, at 858 (“[P]roponents of the modern position contend that all of CIL, 
unlike treaties, is ‘self-executing’ federal law.”). 
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  
187. On the contrary, although early drafts of Article III included reference to the Law of Nations 
as federal law, the Framers eventually omitted the reference. See William S. Dodge, The 
Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 687, 705–11 (2002). 
188. U.S. CONST. art. VI.  
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all rules of customary international law as preemptive federal law, without 
the need for any federal political branch direction. Instead, these 
provisions suggest decisively that it was the federal political branches that 
were granted authority to define rules of customary international law and 
incorporate them into U.S. federal law. Neither Article I, section 8 nor 
Articles III and VI provide for an independent federal judicial role in 
making rules of customary international law, as envisaged by the 
modernists. 
On the contrary, the modernist position is difficult to reconcile with 
constitutional limits on the law-making powers of the federal courts. The 
central lesson of Erie is that federal courts have limited independent 
authority to make rules of law. When Justice Brandeis declared that, 
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of 
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state,”189 he 
made clear that the federal courts lacked independent authority to make 
rules of general common law, even in fields where federal legislative and 
executive authority was unquestioned. Thus, “[Erie] recognizes that 
federal judicial power to displace state law is not coextensive with the 
scope of dormant congressional power. Rather, the Court must point to 
some source, such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional provision, as 
authority for the creation of substantive federal law.”190 
Application of customary international law rules by federal courts often 
entails many of the aspects of independent judicial law-making that are 
present in the application of rules of general common law.191 As the 
revisionists have demonstrated, customary international law rules are 
frequently ill-defined and controversial, providing only limited direction 
to courts and involving only limited participation by U.S. political 
branches.192 In these circumstances, judicial application of customary 
international law involves much the same type of expansive judicial law-
making as does the application of general common law rules—and raises 
the same concerns as those identified in Erie. 
                                                     
189. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
190. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11–12 
(1975); see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321, 1414–15 (2001). 
191. Modernists and revisionists spar over the question whether courts “make” or “find” rules of 
customary international law. Nothing should turn on the characterization. There is no disagreement 
that courts must look to objective external sources (such as state practice, treaties, decisions, and 
commentary) in “finding” international law, nor that this process inevitably entails a fair measure of 
law-“making.” 
192. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 327–31; Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2268–72. 
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On the other hand, other rules of customary international law are well-
defined and specific, and enjoy extensive support from U.S. political 
branches.193 In these circumstances, Erie’s concerns about unfettered 
judicial law-making are only tenuously implicated: exercising their 
constitutional authority over the Nation’s foreign relations, the federal 
political branches have made rules of law, which U.S. courts are able to 
apply with no more judicial law-making than their application of statutory 
or treaty provisions. The modernist position provides no principled means 
of distinguishing between these different categories of customary 
international law, and the different types of judicial action required by 
different international law rules, and instead broadly approves of both. 
It is no answer for modernists to cite judicial authority holding that 
“international law is part of our law.”194 As the revisionists have shown, 
that authority stands only for the proposition that rules of customary 
international law are part of U.S. law, without addressing whether those 
rules are also directly applicable in U.S. courts—just as U.S. treaties are 
denominated the law of the land, without resolving whether their 
provisions are self-executing.195 Moreover, pronouncements that 
“international law is part of our law”196 were made in pre-Erie settings, 
when limits on independent judicial law-making absent a sovereign 
mandate to do so had not yet been articulated. In any event, as discussed 
below, in applying customary international law during this period, U.S. 
courts consistently inquired whether particular rules were intended by the 
political branches to be judicially-applicable;197 the adage that 
international law was part of our law did not resolve the question whether 
that law was also self-executing and directly applicable in U.S. courts. 
The modernist position also gives rise to serious risks of judicial 
interference with the federal political branches’ conduct of foreign 
relations. Judicial application of all customary international law rules, 
without inquiry into political branch authorization, risks undermining the 
President and Congress in their dealings with foreign states.198 As the 
revisionists have demonstrated, judicial application of some rules of 
customary international law—particularly “new” rules, including 
                                                     
193. Examples include foreign sovereign immunity, consular immunity, and treatment of aliens. 
See supra section II.A.1. 
194. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1831 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 
(1900)). 
195. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 822–23; supra section II.A.2. 
196. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (1900). 
197. See infra section II.B.1. 
198. See supra section II.A.1; infra section II.B.1. 
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emergent human rights protections—have significant foreign policy 
implications.199 Application of those types of rules is often likely to 
require U.S. courts to make inquiries into, and judgments about, foreign 
sovereign actions, potentially provoking foreign protests and potential 
retaliation. That is particularly true of many contemporary rules of 
international human rights law, including rules regarding arbitrary 
detention, capital punishment, race and gender discrimination, asylum, 
and labor rights.200 
The likelihood of foreign offense or retaliation is heightened by the 
character of contemporary customary international law. As the 
revisionists have pointed out, contemporary customary international law 
rules are formed more quickly, with less evidence of state practice, than 
“traditional” international law rules.201 Contemporary customary 
international law rules are often based upon declarations or aspirational 
statements in international forums instead of being crystallized through 
state practice.202 As a consequence, contemporary rules of customary 
international law are often more general, ill-defined, and aspirational than 
traditional international law rules—heightening concerns about the 
foreign policy consequences of judicial application of such rules.203 
Reflecting these concerns, the federal courts have consistently been 
reluctant to adopt rules of international law that risk judicial interference 
in the political branches’ conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations. They 
have instead underscored the authority of the President and Congress, 
rather than the Judicial branch, over foreign relations: “[t]he conduct of 
the foreign relations of our government is committed by the constitution 
to the executive and legislative . . . departments.”204 As a consequence, 
foreign policy decisions have “long been held to belong in the domain of 
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry,”205 and courts 
                                                     
199. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 840–41. 
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702 (providing examples of emerging rules); Beth Stephens, 
Litigating Customary International Human Rights Norms, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191 (1995/96). 
201. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 838–40. 
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102 cmt. f & reporters’ note 2; id. § 103 cmt. c & reporters’ note 3; 
D’AMATO, supra note 109, at 44–46, 49–51; J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International 
Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 485–86 (2000). 
203. This does not, however, lead to a conclusion that all customary international law rules are 
inapplicable in U.S. courts, as revisionists suggest. See supra section I.B. Rather, it is necessary to 
distinguish between different rules of customary international law, examining which rules the U.S. 
political branches intended to have judicial application and which rules they did not. 
204. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 
491, 511 (2008). 
205. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); see also Bank 
Markazi v. Peterson, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1328 (2016); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 
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have eschewed applications of customary international law rules, 
including in Sabbatino, that could “interfere with negotiations being 
carried on by the Executive Branch.”206 
These considerations provide further confirmation that the modernist 
position, which presumptively requires judicial application of all rules of 
customary international law, is untenable. Direct application of all 
customary international law rules by U.S. courts entails not only 
unauthorized judicial law-making, but judicial law-making in a context 
that involves especially significant risks of interference with the political 
branches’ exercise of their foreign relations authority. Because of those 
risks, inquiry into the existence of political branch authorization for the 
application of customary international law rules, like that required for the 
provisions of treaties and other international agreements, is particularly 
important. 
There is also no basis for concluding that the federal political branches 
have broadly authorized direct judicial application of all rules of 
customary international law. On the contrary, in many instances, the 
political branches have made clear that they do not want particular rules 
of international law to be directly applied in U.S. courts. The United States 
has ratified most human rights treaties only after attaching reservations, 
declarations, or understandings confirming the treaties’ non-self-
executing status.207 As the revisionists observe,208 it is implausible to 
argue that the non-self-executing provisions of these treaties do not apply 
in U.S. courts, but that parallel rules of customary international law 
(derived in large part from the treaties themselves), do apply, without any 
inquiry as to whether essentially the same rules of international law were 
intended to be self-executing. 
It is no answer to say that “international human rights [law] did not just 
happen to the United States; the political branches deliberately 
participated in its creation.”209 Although it is true that the federal political 
branches participate in the formation of many (but not all210) rules of 
customary international law, that elides the critical question: whether the 
                                                     
417 (2002). 
206. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964).  
207. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 328–29; see generally David Sloss, The 
Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights 
Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999). 
208. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 858; Bradley & Goldsmith, Human 
Rights, supra note 4, at 330–31. 
209. Neuman, supra note 6, at 385. 
210. Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Customary International Law and Statutory Interpretation: An 
Empirical Analysis of Federal Court Decisions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1118, 1163 (2014); Young, 
Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 396–97. 
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political branches have, when participating in making particular rules of 
international law, authorized U.S. courts to apply those rules. Unless the 
political branches have authorized judicial application of a rule of law, 
whether customary international law or otherwise, the federal courts have 
no authority to apply that rule. That is the lesson of Erie and its limits on 
independent judicial law-making. 
Conversely, where the political branches have bound the United States 
to a rule of customary international law, and provided for application of 
that rule in U.S. courts, then federal courts not only may, but must, apply 
that rule. As discussed above, the Constitution provides the federal 
political branches with broad, and exclusive, authority to act for the 
United States in making customary international law and undertaking 
international legal obligations on behalf of the Nation.211 Those grants of 
constitutional authority complement the inherent, and inevitable, power 
of the federal political branches to exercise the sovereign rights and 
obligations of the United States to participate in the formation of 
customary international law.212 In practice, the political branches exercise 
this authority on an ongoing, continuous basis, necessarily committing the 
United States to new or revised obligations under customary international 
law (or declining to undertake such commitments) in the course of its 
international relations. 
When the political branches exercise this authority to make rules of 
customary international law that are intended to have direct application in 
national courts, those rules can and must be applied by U.S. courts. These 
international law rules are no different in international effect than self-
executing treaties, congressional executive agreements, or sole executive 
agreements. In each case, exercising authority granted by the 
Constitution,213 the Executive and Legislative branches make rules of 
international law, with the status of federal law.214 And, in each case, the 
structure and objectives of the Constitution provide for the possibility of 
                                                     
211. See supra section II.A.1. 
212. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (“The power to 
acquire territory by discovery and occupation, the power to expel undesirable aliens, the power to 
make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense, none of 
which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist as inherently inseparable from the 
conception of nationality.”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (“[T]he United 
States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations; 
and it was their interest as well as their duty to provide; that those laws should be respected and 
obeyed; in their national character and capacity.”). 
213. See supra section II.A.2; supra note 168. 
214. See supra section II.A.2. 
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direct application of these international law rules in U.S. courts, 
depending on the intentions of the political branches. 
It is no answer to say that customary international law (unlike treaties) 
is not included expressly among the categories of law referred to in Article 
VI’s Supremacy Clause as the “supreme Law of the Land.”215 The same 
observation applies to congressional-executive agreements216 and sole 
executive agreements217—both of which may also be self-executing and 
directly applicable in U.S. courts, but which are also omitted from Article 
VI’s express text.218 The same observation also applies to rules of federal 
common law, and to regulations and similar forms of law made by federal 
administrative agencies,219 all of which are unquestionably applicable in 
U.S. courts notwithstanding their omission from Article VI’s text.220 The 
absence of customary international law—like the absence of these other 
types of federal law—from the text of Article VI is therefore not decisive. 
The Constitution grants the federal political branches the authority to 
make customary international law, which includes the power to make 
rules of customary international law with the status of federal law that are 
directly applicable in U.S. courts, just as other types of federal law, not 
expressly included in Article VI, are directly applicable in U.S. courts. 
Moreover, Article VI supplies an entirely satisfactory textual basis for 
these conclusions. The Supremacy Clause’s provision that the 
Constitution, U.S. treaties, and “the Laws of the United States which shall 
                                                     
215. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
216. See supra section II.A.2; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).  
217. See supra section II.A.2; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 
301 U.S. 324 (1937).  
218. It is also no answer to argue, as revisionists do, that customary international law is made by 
the international community, while other forms of law under Article VI are made by the U.S. political 
branches. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 857–58. Treaties and other 
international agreements are, of course, made by foreign states (sometimes many foreign states), as 
well as the United States; conversely, customary international law binding on the United States also 
almost always requires assent by the U.S. political branches, albeit less formally and explicitly. More 
fundamentally, the revisionist response fails to focus on the critical question, which is whether, in 
assenting to a rule of customary international law, the U.S. political branches intended that rule to be 
directly applicable in U.S. courts. It is these actions and intentions of U.S. political bodies, not the 
world community, that are decisive in determining whether rules of international law are directly 
applicable in U.S. courts (just as it is the intentions of the U.S. political branches that are decisive in 
determining the self-executing status of treaties). See infra section II.B.2; infra Part III; infra Part IV.  
219. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 756–65 
(2010).  
220. See id. at 758–65; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (noting federal 
common law is “law” for purposes of statutory arising under jurisdiction; “laws” include “claims 
founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin”). The same rationale applies 
under Article VI, and to customary international law. 
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be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]” are the “Law of the Land” 
has given rise to substantial controversy.221 Nonetheless, the Clause 
provides ample grounds for categorizing rules of customary international 
law as federal law.222 Article VI’s reference to “Laws of the United States” 
is not limited to “Acts” of Congress,223 and instead was drafted 
expansively to extend to other forms of U.S. “Law” made pursuant to the 
Constitution, including congressional-executive and sole-executive 
agreements, as well as federal common law.224 As a textual matter, this 
formulation encompasses rules of customary international law, made by 
the federal political branches “in pursuance of” their constitutional foreign 
affairs powers, and then interpreted and applied by the federal courts “in 
pursuance of” their constitutional judicial authority.225 Alternatively, 
grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts over international matters 
(including, as discussed below, admiralty, maritime, and alienage 
jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Statute) are readily interpreted as providing 
                                                     
221. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 63; Craig Green, Erie and Problems of Constitutional 
Structure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661 (2008); Monaghan, supra note 219. 
222. Alternatively, contemporary authorities appear to have regarded customary international law 
as “constitutional” in character (and therefore falling within Article VI’s reference to the 
Constitution). See William R. Castro, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts 
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 528 (1986) (reprinting draft 
opinion by William Paterson, treating law of nations as arising under Constitution: “[t]his is an 
offence—How? By the law of nations, or, in other words, by the common law, which comprehends 
the law of nations. It is too an offence arising under the constn, as distinct from an offence arising 
under the law of the U. States; because we have no stat. on the subject”). 
223. William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of Customary International Law in the United 
States, 17 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 21, 40 (2009) [hereinafter Dodge, After Sosa]; Peter 
L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1568–71 (2008) (noting that initial 
drafts of Article VI applied to “Acts,” but were revised to refer to “Laws”); cf. Clark, Sole Executive 
Agreements, supra note 166, at 1575. 
224. See supra section II.A.2. That reading is supported by the reference in Article VI to the “Laws 
of any State,” which plainly referred to all forms of state law (not merely state statutes). Monaghan, 
supra note 219, at 767; Strauss, supra note 223, at 1568–69. 
225. This conclusion is not inconsistent with nineteenth century decisions suggesting that the 
reference to “Laws” in Articles III and VI did not include common law rules. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. 
v. 365 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 543–45 (1828) (maritime law is not “Law” of United 
States under Article III); Osborn v. President, Dirs. & Co. of Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 738 
(1824) (“[T]he 3d article of the Constitution . . . declares[] that ‘the judicial power shall extend to all 
cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their authority.’”). The critical distinction is that rules of 
customary international law, which the political branches authorize U.S. courts to apply, are not 
judge-made common law. Rules of customary international law are “Law” made by the political 
branches, pursuant to their constitutional foreign relations powers, which the federal courts are then 
authorized by specialized statutory grants of jurisdiction to apply. That provides a textual explanation 
for the inclusion of both international agreements other than treaties and rules of customary 
international law in Article VI’s reference to “Laws.” Cf. Monaghan, supra note 219, at 755–65 
(arguing that legislation, not common law, is “made” for purposes of Article VI). 
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authority for the federal courts to apply, as rules of federal “Law” under 
Article VI, rules of customary international law made pursuant to those 
jurisdictional grants.226 
The conclusion that rules of customary international law are the “Law 
of the Land” for purposes of Article VI is supported by the historic rule 
that customary international law is “part of the law of the land” or “part 
of our law.”227 As the revisionists have shown, this phrase did not imply 
that customary international law was federal law or that it had preemptive 
effects.228 Importantly, however, the phrases “part of our law” and “law 
of the land” did imply that customary international law was “law” and 
therefore the possibility of direct application in judicial proceedings. This 
is an inherent aspect of the concept of “law,” as contemporary 
commentary and judicial authority concluded, both generally229 and with 
specific application to the law of nations.230 Thus, when the Framers 
granted the President and Congress the constitutional authority to make 
customary international law as part of their foreign affairs authority, they 
did so in the context of this understanding of the concept of law. As a 
consequence, rules of customary international law, made by the political 
branches, were “part of our law” and applicable in U.S. courts, in the same 
manner as other forms of international law. 
Judicial application of rules of customary international law, when the 
political branches have provided for such application, does not violate 
separation of powers principles.231 On the contrary, where the political 
branches have made a rule of customary international law, which they 
intend to be self-executing, it would offend separation of powers 
                                                     
226. See infra section II.B.1; Dodge, Alien Tort Statute, supra note 187, at 689–90; Verlinden B.V. 
v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). 
227. See supra section I.A; supra section II.A.2. 
228. Bellia & Clark, supra note 63, at 11; see David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized 
Nation: The Early American Constitution, The Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International 
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 1001–02 (2010). 
229. Peterson v. Davis (1848) 136 Eng. Rep. 1241, 1243 (C.B.) (“[C]onstant immemorial usage, 
sanctified and recognised by the Courts of Westminster Hall, and in many instances by the legislature 
[make it now] as much a part of the law of the land as any other course of practice which custom has 
introduced and established.”); Fogue v. Gale (1747) 95 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B.) (“[W]e cannot depart 
from the practice, which is the law of the Court, and, as such, is the law of the land . . . .”); 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *422; see also STORY, supra note 115, § 966. 
230. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67.  
231. Revisionists sometimes suggest that, “if customary international law can be made by practice 
wholly outside the United States it has no basis in popular sovereignty at all.” See Trimble, A 
Revisionist View, supra note 4, at 721. That is unconvincing. It ignores the decisive role of the U.S. 
political branches in making customary international law, see supra section II.A.1, and the 
requirement for political branch authorization to U.S. courts to apply those rules of international law, 
see supra section II.A.2. 
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principles if federal courts did not apply that rule.232 The position of the 
U.S. Executive branch regarding judicial application of customary 
international law rules of foreign sovereign immunity is again instructive: 
“The federal government cannot effectively invoke standards of 
international law to ensure continued favorable treatment by foreign 
governments for American governmental property abroad if these 
standards are not given effect by the political subdivisions of the United 
States.”233 
Nor is judicial application of customary international law in these 
circumstances likely to interfere with the conduct of U.S. foreign 
relations. In accepting a particular customary international law rule, the 
political branches are in a position to assess the risks of interference with 
U.S. foreign policy from judicial application of the rule, and to conclude 
that those risks either do not exist or are outweighed by other 
considerations. Indeed, the refusal of federal courts to apply rules of 
international law when the political branches have provided for judicial 
application of a rule would itself presumptively undermine the political 
branches’ conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations. A failure of U.S. 
courts to apply rules of foreign sovereign immunity, or rules of head-of-
state or consular immunity, would again provide obvious examples of this 
point. 
Judicial application of customary international law also offends neither 
federalism interests nor democratic values when it has been provided for 
by the political branches. As discussed above, the Constitution empowers 
the federal political branches, and not the states, to participate in making 
customary international law;234 when the political branches do so, they do 
not intrude upon state sovereignty, but exercise exclusive federal 
authority. Likewise, when federal courts give direct effect to customary 
international law rules, as provided for by the political branches, they 
apply rules of law made by organs of government elected by the entire 
United States. Giving effect to those rules advances, rather than detracts 
from, constitutional values. 
* * * 
In sum, the Constitution provides the federal government—as 
distinguished from the several states—with broad, largely exclusive, 
authority over U.S. foreign relations in Articles I and II. Given this 
expansive federal authority, and the compelling need for the Nation to 
                                                     
232. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1845 (“Bradley and Goldsmith’s approach creates, 
rather than alleviates, separation of powers concerns.”). 
233. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 40, Republic of Argentina v. City 
of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252 (N.Y. 1969). 
234. See supra section II.A.1. 
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speak with “one voice” about the existence and content of customary 
international law and U.S. international legal obligations, the proposition 
that customary international law is generally a matter of state law is 
untenable. Rather, all rules of customary international law, and their 
applicability in U.S. courts, are matters of federal law, subject to uniform 
interpretation by the federal courts. 
At the same time, notwithstanding the status of customary international 
law as federal law, the Constitution also limits the authority of U.S. courts 
to apply particular rules of customary international law. That is true for 
the same reasons that only “self-executing” provisions of U.S. treaties and 
other international agreements apply directly in U.S. courts, even though 
such agreements have the status of federal law. Thus, the proposition that 
all rules of customary international law are presumptively applicable in 
U.S. courts is also untenable. Rather, as with U.S. treaties and other 
international agreements, further inquiry is required to determine whether, 
in accepting a customary international law rule, the U.S. political branches 
intended that rule to be self-executing and directly applicable in U.S. 
courts, without the need for further legislative action. 
B. Judicial Authority 
The foregoing analysis provides the most satisfactory explanation of 
U.S. judicial authority applying customary international law. That 
authority is extensive, with multiple strands of precedent, much of which 
was decided in historical settings that differ materially from contemporary 
America. Nonetheless, this authority adopts analysis and reaches results 
generally paralleling those set forth above. Under this approach, U.S. 
courts have routinely applied rules of customary international law, 
effectively treating them as national law, but only after concluding that 
the federal political branches had provided for judicial application of these 
rules. Conversely, this authority is inconsistent with central elements of 
both the modernist and revisionist positions, as well as the various other 
alternatives that have been proposed for the treatment of customary 
international law. 
1. Separation of Powers 
U.S. courts have applied customary international law since the 
beginning of the Republic, in decisions too numerous to cite.235 Contrary 
                                                     
235. See Edwin Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 239, 259 (1932) (in its first thirty years of existence, the Supreme Court decided eighty-two cases 
raising issues of international law); Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in 
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to both the modernist and revisionist positions, however, U.S. courts have 
generally applied particular customary international law rules only after 
inquiring whether the political branches had, either expressly or 
impliedly, provided for judicial application of those rules, undertaking an 
analysis analogous to that used in determining whether a treaty provision 
is self-executing.236 In doing so, U.S. courts have examined a variety of 
factors, including the content and character of the relevant rule of 
customary international law and the actions and statements of the political 
branches regarding that rule. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rose v. Himely237 illustrates the early 
approach of U.S. courts to international law. Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion addressed three questions of what was regarded as contemporary 
customary international law.238 First, the Court held that international law 
entitled the courts of one nation to consider whether a court of another 
nation had properly exercised jurisdiction in rendering a judgment.239 
Second, Chief Justice Marshall held that international law entitled a 
nation’s courts to deny recognition of a judgment regarding property that 
was never within the rendering court’s territorial jurisdiction,240 and that 
U.S. courts could not recognize a St. Domingo court’s judgment rendered 
in these circumstances.241 Third, the Court also held that the question 
whether St. Domingo was an independent sovereign state, or a French 
colony, was an issue of international law that was for the political 
branches, not the courts, to decide.242 
Importantly, the Court’s decision in Rose distinguished between rules 
of international law that were addressed to courts (the first two issues 
noted above)243 and rules that were addressed to the political branches of 
                                                     
Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L. J. 855, 872 (2005) 
(in its first forty-five years of existence, 25% of the Supreme Court’s decisions involved foreign 
affairs).  
236. See infra section II.B.1. 
237. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808). 
238. The law of nations was broadly defined in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to 
include what came to be regarded as private international law and public international law. Edwin D. 
Dickinson, Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 
26–29 (1952); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 
1263–64 (1985).  
239. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 271.  
240. Id. at 276–77. 
241. Id. at 278–79. 
242. Id. at 272. 
243. Id. at 271 (“[I]t is apparent that the courts of that country [England] hold themselves warranted 
in examining the jurisdiction of a foreign court, by which a sentence of condemnation has passed, not 
only in relation to the constitutional powers of the court, but also in relation to the situation of the 
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government (the third issue).244 The Court was prepared to apply the first 
two rules of international law directly (and to hold, as a consequence, that 
the St. Domingo judgment had not conferred valid title), but it was 
unwilling to apply the third rule (holding that this rule was “obviously 
addressed to sovereigns, not to courts”).245 The Court’s decision treated 
the relevant rules of customary international law differently, in each 
instance based almost entirely on the content and character of those rules 
and, in particular, whether the rule was “addressed to” courts, as opposed 
to political branches.246 
A similar approach to international law was adopted in Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon,247 which considered “the very delicate and 
important inquiry, whether an American citizen can assert, in an American 
court, a title to an armed national vessel [of another nation] found within 
the waters of the United States.”248 In answering this question in the 
negative, applying a rule that would become the doctrine of foreign 
sovereign immunity, the Court again relied upon three rules of customary 
international law. 
First, Chief Justice Marshall held that a nation possesses absolute 
jurisdiction over its own territory: “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within 
its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.”249 The Court 
declared that this rule of international law applied to courts as well as other 
organs of the Nation, reasoning that a court’s jurisdiction was “a branch 
of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign 
                                                     
thing on which those powers are exercised; at least so far as the right of the foreign court to take 
jurisdiction of the thing is regulated by the law of nations and by treaties. There is no reason to suppose 
that the tribunals of any other country whatever deny themselves the same power. It is, therefore, at 
present, considered as the uniform practice of civilized nations, and is adopted by this court as the 
true principle which ought to govern in this case.”) (emphasis added); id. at 276–77 (“[I]f [a court] 
exercises a jurisdiction which, according to the law of nations, its sovereign could not confer, however 
available its sentences may be within the dominions of the prince from who the authority is derived, 
they are not regarded by foreign courts. This distinction is taken upon this principle, that the law of 
nations is the law of all tribunals in the society of nations, and is supposed to be equally understood 
by all.”) (emphasis added). 
244. Id. at 272 (“[T]he doctrines of Vattel have been particularly referred to. But the language of 
that writer is obviously addressed to sovereigns, not to courts. It is for governments to decide whether 
they will consider St. Domingo as an independent nation, and until such decision shall be made, . . . 
courts of justice must consider the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered . . . .”). 
245. Id. at 272.  
246. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited only international law authority (Vattel), referring 
to neither the Constitution nor constitutional separation of powers principles. Id. at 271–72. 
247. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
248. Id. at 135.  
249. Id. at 136. 
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power,”250 and therefore subject to the general principle of territoriality. 
Second, the Court held that nations could either expressly or impliedly 
consent to limitations on their territorial jurisdiction,251 and that “by 
common usage, and by common opinion, growing out of that usage,”252 
nations had expressed such consent by not exercising territorial 
“jurisdiction over the public armed ships of a foreign sovereign entering 
a port open for their reception.”253 Finally, the Court also held that:  
[The] sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this 
implication [of consent], but that until such power be exerted in a 
manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be 
considered as having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a 
jurisdiction, which it would be a breach of faith to exercise.254 
As with Rose, the Court’s opinion directly applied customary 
international law in order to deny an otherwise valid claim to title under 
U.S. law. In doing so, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the rules of 
international law were addressed to, and applicable in, national courts—
namely, territorial jurisdictional limits and immunity of foreign warships 
from local judicial jurisdiction.255 Likewise, the Court acknowledged that 
international law permitted states to revoke this immunity, but held that 
the decision to do so involved “rather questions of policy than of law,” 
and was “for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion.”256 Again like Rose, 
focusing on the content and character of particular international law 
rules,257 the Court treated some rules of international law as being 
addressed to national courts (which the Court applied) and others as being 
addressed to, and capable of being invoked or applied by, the political 
branches (which the Court did not apply).258 
                                                     
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 136–37. 
252. Id. at 136. 
253. Id. at 144 (recognizing the “principle of public law, that national ships of war, entering the 
port of a friendly power open for their reception are to be considered as exempted by the consent of 
that power from its jurisdiction”). 
254. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).  
255. See id. at 136, 144 (territorial jurisdiction of courts; immunity of foreign warship from judicial 
jurisdiction); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 299 (1822) (for foreign nations, “all 
the departments of the government make but one sovereignty”). 
256. Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.  
257. As in Rose, the Court relied only on international authority (Vattel and Bynkershoek), and did 
not refer to the U.S. Constitution or constitutional separation of powers principles. 
258. The Court’s treatment of foreign sovereign immunity was subsequently applied generally, 
outside the context of prize cases, to all categories of jurisdiction in U.S. courts. See Berizzi Bros. Co. 
v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882); United 
States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 525 (1875). It was also applied in state courts. See Kline v. Kaneko, 
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U.S. courts adopted the same approach to customary international law 
in prize cases. Both modernists and revisionists have devoted only limited 
attention to prize decisions.259 That lack of attention is surprising, because 
prize disputes formed a highly important part of the U.S. courts’ 
international caseload during the early nineteenth century,260 with courts 
routinely applying customary international law rules,261 and because the 
treatment of international law in these decisions parallels its treatment in 
other fields. Prize decisions were rendered pursuant to legislation giving 
federal courts jurisdiction over “all civil causes of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction,”262 and, in prize cases, exclusive jurisdiction.263 This 
jurisdictional grant was understood as both authorizing and requiring U.S. 
courts to apply customary international law rules governing issues of 
neutrality, prize, and capture, which they routinely did.264 Again, 
however, U.S. courts did so only after inquiring whether particular rules 
of international law were directly applicable in U.S. courts, focusing 
principally on the content and character of such rules. 
                                                     
535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (“[L]ogic mandates that courts be bound by the State 
Department’s recommendation.”); United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 56 N.E.2d 577, 580 (N.Y. 
1944). 
259. See, Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 827 n.74 (addressing the decisions 
in passing); Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1830 & n.33 (addressing the decisions in passing). 
260. See supra note 235; David Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
31, 33 (1995) (in the early nineteenth century, “the law of prize was the law of nations”); Lavinbuk, 
supra note 235, at 872. 
261. See William R. Castro, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in An Age of Privateers, 
Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1993). There was extensive contemporary 
commentary on the application of international law by U.S. prize courts. See H. WHEATON, A DIGEST 
OF THE LAW OF MARITIME CAPTURE AND PRIZE (1815).  
262. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 77. It was undisputed that “[i]n cases of prize . . . the 
courts of admiralty have an undisturbed and exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same according 
to the law of nations.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *108; see also STORY, supra note 
115, § 865 (“[C]ourts of common law [were] bound to abstain from any decision on questions of this 
sort.”). 
263. Castro, supra note 261, at 121–22, 129–35, 139–49; Harrington Putnam, How the Federal 
Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 467–70 (1925). 
264. See The Schooner Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 284 (1815) (“The Court of prize is 
emphatically a Court of the law of nations; and it takes neither its character nor its rules from the mere 
municipal regulations of any country.”); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 
198 (1815) (“The law of nations is the great source from which we derive those rules, respecting 
belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognized by all civilized and commercial states, throughout 
Europe and America.”); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794) (federal court has 
jurisdiction to determine “whether such restitution can be made consistently with the laws of nations 
and the treaties and laws of the United States”); Bederman, supra note 260, at 51 (“[F]rom time 
immemorial, when a national court adjudicated a case of a maritime capture it was obliged to follow 
international law.”).  
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In The Nereide,265 for example, the Supreme Court affirmed its 
authority, and obligation, to apply international law in prize cases. Chief 
Justice Marshall held that the law of nations treated the property of 
neutrals as neutral, and therefore exempt from capture, even if that 
property was shipped on the vessels of belligerents.266 His opinion 
explained that “congress has not left it to this department to say whether 
the rule of foreign nations shall be applied to them, but has by law applied 
that rule.”267 Although the captors argued that the Court should apply an 
exception to the applicable rule of neutrality, because the putative neutral 
cargo owner’s home state (Spain) applied such an exception, the Court 
refused, on the basis that this was an exception for the political branches 
to invoke. It reasoned: 
If it be the will of the government to apply to Spain any rule 
respecting captures which Spain is supposed to apply to us, the 
government will manifest that will by passing an act for the 
purpose. Till such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the law 
of nations which is a part of the law of the land.268 
As in Rose and Schooner Exchange, the Court both confirmed its 
authority to apply customary international law as the “law of the land” 
when so intended by the political branches, and denied its authority to 
apply such rules of international law without such political direction. 
Likewise, in determining when the judiciary was authorized to apply a 
particular customary international law rule, the Court again looked to the 
content and character of the rule, evaluating to which branch of 
government the rule was addressed. 
Similarly, in Brown v. United States,269 Chief Justice Marshall 
considered whether the property of an enemy national, located on U.S. 
territory, could be seized following a declaration of war. The Court first 
addressed the claim that the President could not violate “the modern law 
of nations,” which assertedly forbid such seizures.270 The Court refused to 
consider the argument, reasoning that the relevant rules of international 
                                                     
265. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815). 
266. Id. at 426. 
267. Id. at 423. 
268. Id. Elsewhere, the Court reasoned:  
[R]eciprocating to the subjects of a nation, or retaliating on them, its unjust proceedings towards 
our citizens, is a political not a legal measure. It is for consideration of the government not of its 
Courts. . . . It is not for us to depart from the beaten track prescribed for us, and to tread the 
devious and intricate path of politics. 
Id. at 422–23. 
269. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). 
270. Id. at 147. 
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law regarding seizures of enemy property were addressed to the U.S. 
political branches, not to U.S. courts. In analysis paralleling that used to 
distinguish between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties,271 the 
Court concluded: 
This argument must assume for its basis the position that modern 
usage constitutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself 
by its own force, and not through the sovereign power. This 
position is not allowed. This usage is a guide which the sovereign 
follows or abandons at his will. The rule, like other precepts of 
morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed to the 
judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot be disregarded 
by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded.272 
As with prior prize decisions, and with U.S. treaties, the Court applied 
rules of customary international law but distinguished between those rules 
of international law that were addressed to, and directly applicable by, the 
judicial branch and those that were addressed to the political branches.273 
The Court concluded that, under the Constitution, the decision whether to 
confiscate property, on land, of an enemy national was one for 
Congress,274 not the judiciary or the President, and that Congress had not 
approved confiscations of property in these circumstances. 
                                                     
271. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“[W]hen the terms of the stipulation import 
a contract, . . . the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the 
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”) (emphasis added); 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 244 (1796) (“No one can doubt that a treaty may stipulate, that 
certain acts shall be done by the Legislature; that other acts shall be done by the Executive; and others 
by the Judiciary.”) (emphasis added). 
272. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128 (emphasis added). 
273. The same analysis is reflected in La Amistad de Rues, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 385 (1820), which 
held that, although U.S. courts will restore a prize, captured in violation of U.S. neutrality, to its 
owner, they will not entertain other claims arising from an allegedly unlawful capture. Justice Story 
reasoned that, even if a capture violated the law of nations, “it cannot be a matter of judicial complaint, 
that they are exercised with severity, even if the parties do transcend those rules which the customary 
laws of war justify.” Id. at 390. The Court reasoned that such claims “have never been held within the 
cognizance of the prize tribunals of neutral nations,” and that “[u]ntil Congress shall choose to 
prescribe a different rule, this Court will, in cases of this nature, confine itself to the exercise of the 
simple authority to decree restitution, and decline all inquiries into questions of damages for asserted 
wrongs.” Id. The rationale of La Amistad was again that some customary international law rules were 
addressed to, and applicable by, U.S. courts, but that other rules were not. See also United States v. 
Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 711–12 (1832) (applying rule of international law regarding 
acquisition of territory, which was otherwise addressed to political branches, based on specific 
statutory authorization). 
274. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 716 (1900) (“When war breaks out, the question, What 
shall be done with enemy property in our country?—is a question rather of policy than of law. . . . [I]t 
is proper for the consideration of a department which can modify it at will; not for the consideration 
of a department which can pursue only the law as it is written. It is proper for the consideration of the 
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The Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in its 1900 decision in 
The Paquete Habana,275 which considered the legality of a U.S. gunboat’s 
seizure of two Spanish fishing vessels as prizes of war. The Court first 
observed that, by virtue of a Presidential Proclamation, it was “the general 
policy of the government to conduct the war in accordance with the 
principles of international law.”276 The Court then reviewed an extensive 
body of state practice and commentary, concluding that: 
[B]y the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and 
independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an 
established rule of international law, founded on considerations 
of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the 
mutual convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing 
vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, 
unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching 
and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of 
war.277 
The Court reasoned that “[i]nternational law is part of our law,” but 
continued, noting that international law “must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.”278 The Court emphasized that the rule of international law 
which it had identified “is one which prize courts administering the law 
of nations are bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the 
absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government.”279 The 
Court concluded with the declaration that “it is the duty of this court, 
sitting as the highest prize court of the United States, and administering 
the law of nations,”280 to hold the capture unlawful. 
                                                     
legislature, not of the executive or judiciary.”). 
275. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
276. Id. at 712 (citing and quoting Presidential Proclamation No. 6, 30 Stat. 1769 (Apr. 22, 1898)); 
see id. at 700. Modernists sometimes suggest that “[t]he century-old case of The Paquete Habana is 
but one example of a routine Supreme Court decision that enforced a rule of customary international 
law against an executive official, without a trace of separation of powers concerns.” Koh, State Law?, 
supra note 6, at 1842. That is inaccurate. The Court was particularly attentive to the President’s 
express incorporation of international law by the Presidential Proclamation and to its own role as a 
prize court—a role authorized by Congress and the President which permitted the Court to apply the 
law of nations.  
277. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 708. 
278. Id. at 700 (emphasis added). The Court qualified this reference to international law with the 
further comment that, “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.” Id.  
279. Id. at 708 (emphasis added).  
280. Id. at 714. 
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Although routinely cited by modernists,281 Paquete Habana instead 
supports a more nuanced approach to the status of customary international 
law in U.S. courts. The decision confirmed the authority of U.S. courts to 
apply rules of international law directly, but only when Congress and the 
President had so directed. That was made clear by the Court’s emphasis 
upon the special character of federal jurisdiction over prize cases and the 
Presidential Proclamation providing for application of international 
law.282 It was also made clear by the Court’s numerous references to the 
political branches’ ultimate authority over issues of customary 
international law, repeatedly referring to the “absence of any treaty or 
other public act of their own government in relation to the matter.”283 
Although Paquete Habana stands for the proposition that U.S. courts may 
apply customary international law, it also makes clear that they may do so 
only in some circumstances, and in particular only where the political 
branches have provided for judicial application of a rule. 
Outside the context of prize cases, other nineteenth century decisions 
adopted the same basic approach to customary international law. In Oetjen 
v. Central Leather Co.,284 the Supreme Court applied what would later 
become known as the act of state doctrine. The Court first held that 
“clearly settled principles of law” established that recognition of foreign 
states was a decision for Congress and the President, which was “not 
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”285 The Court then held that 
“principles of international law” established that: 
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of 
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not 
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done 
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such 
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by 
sovereign powers as between themselves.286 
The Court emphasized that these “principles of international law” were 
applicable “in the courts” of independent states and “rest[ed] at last upon 
                                                     
281. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1842; Neuman, supra note 6, at 374; Henkin, 
International Law as Law, supra note 20, at 1555.  
282. 175 U.S. at 708, 710, 712 (holding that the presidential proclamation issued on April 26, 1898 
during the war with Spain “clearly manifest[ed] the general policy of the Government to conduct the 
war in accordance with the principles of international law sanctioned by the recent practice of 
nations”) (citing Proclamation No. 7, 30 Stat. 1770 (Apr. 26, 1898)). 
283. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, 708. 
284. 246 U.S. 297 (1918). 
285. Id. at 302. 
286. Id. at 303 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)). 
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the highest considerations of international comity and expediency.”287 The 
Court again relied on the character and content of the international law 
rules that it identified, which were addressed specifically to national 
courts: “the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of 
the government of another done within its own territory.”288 Other early 
act of state decisions were to the same effect in describing the act of state 
doctrine as a rule of international law and that this rule was directly 
applicable in U.S. courts.289 
In the twentieth century, judicial authority generally adopted the same 
approach, only applying particular rules of international law when 
expressly or impliedly authorized by the political branches. In applying 
maritime law in The Western Maid,290 for example, Justice Holmes 
explained: 
[W]e must realize that however ancient may be the traditions of 
maritime law, however diverse the sources from which it has been 
drawn, it derives its whole and only power in this country from 
having been accepted and adopted by the United States. There is 
no mystic over-law to which even the United States must bow. 
When a case is said to be governed by foreign law or by general 
maritime law that is only a short way of saying that for this 
purpose the sovereign power takes up a rule suggested from 
without and makes it part of its own rules.291 
This analysis parallels that outlined above, in Rose, Schooner Exchange, 
and elsewhere, as well as that applied to U.S. treaties and other 
international agreements; all of these authorities recognize that the 
political branches may adopt a rule of international law, but that, until they 
do so, and provide for judicial application of the rule, U.S. courts have no 
authority to apply the rule. 
More recent judicial decisions have adopted the same approach even 
more explicitly. Invariably, post-Erie discussion centers on Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,292 where Justice Harlan formulated, and 
then applied, the modern act of state doctrine to decline inquiry into the 
                                                     
287. Id. at 302–04. The Supreme Court later held, in Sabbatino, that the act of state doctrine was 
not a rule of customary international law. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421–
22, 421 n.22, 427 (1964). The Court adopted a different view in Oetjen, Underhill, and other earlier 
decisions.  
288. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303 (emphasis added). 
289. Underhill, 168 U.S. 250; Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).  
290. 257 U.S. 419 (1922). 
291. Id. at 432.  
292. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
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lawfulness of a Cuban expropriation of property within Cuban territory. 
In the Court’s words, the “act of state doctrine . . . precludes the courts of 
this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized 
foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.”293 Perhaps 
inevitably, the Court’s decision has been invoked by both modernists294 
and revisionists;295 properly interpreted, however, the decision does not 
support either position. 
The Sabbatino Court first made clear that the act of state doctrine was 
not a rule of customary international law, rejecting the contrary holdings 
in Oetjen and other early act of state decisions.296 Instead, the Court held 
that the doctrine was mandated by separation of powers concerns, aimed 
at preventing judicial interference in the political branches’ conduct of 
U.S. foreign relations.297 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Harlan went 
out of his way298 to hold that the act of state doctrine was federal law, 
using reasoning that is invariably cited in modernist writings. He quoted, 
with evident approval, a law review article written by Judge Jessup a year 
after Erie, which “cautioned that rules of international law should not be 
left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations.”299 The Court 
then went on to say that this “basic rationale is equally applicable to the 
act of state doctrine.”300 
Importantly, however, the Sabbatino Court also held that the act of state 
doctrine precluded a U.S. court from applying customary international 
law to assess the validity of the Cuban expropriation. While recognizing 
that “United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in 
                                                     
293. Id. at 401. 
294. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1834; Neuman, supra note 6, at 378. 
295. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 859.  
296. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421–22, 421 n.22, 427. Cf. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302–03.  
297. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423–28.  
298. Justice Harlan noted that the Court “could, perhaps, in this diversity action, avoid the question 
of deciding whether federal or state law is applicable to this aspect of the litigation,” because New 
York courts had adopted a version of the act of state doctrine. Id. at 424. But the Court held instead 
that it was essential to apply federal law to the question whether the customary international law rules 
relied upon by Sabbatino could be applied in U.S. courts.  
299. Id. at 425. 
300. Id. (emphasis added). The Court also went on to cite decisions adopting rules of federal 
common law (e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D’Oench, Duhme & 
Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942)) and then declared that:  
[T]he act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on federal and state courts alike, but 
compelled by neither international law nor the Constitution, [and its] continuing vitality depends 
on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political 
branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.  
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427–28.  
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appropriate circumstances,”301 the Court nonetheless declined to do so in 
Sabbatino, reasoning that: 
[T]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning 
a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is 
for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts 
can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to 
circumstances of fact, rather than on the sensitive task of 
establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest 
or with international justice. It is also evident that some aspects 
of international law touch much more sharply on national nerves 
than do others; the less important the implications of an issue are 
for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for 
exclusivity in the political branches.302 
Based on these conclusions about the content of the relevant international 
law rules, the Court held that it would not examine the validity of the 
Cuban expropriation under international law.303 
The Court’s analysis was precisely in keeping with the historic 
approach to customary international law in the United States. Justice 
Harlan acknowledged that international law was potentially applicable in 
U.S. courts, but also held that it would only be applied when the federal 
political branches had provided for judicial application of a particular rule 
of international law. As in Rose, Schooner Exchange, and Paquete 
Habana, the Court focused principally on the content and character of the 
relevant international law rule, including the degree of codification of the 
rule, the consensus regarding the rule, the risk of foreign relations 
interference, and the historic position of the political branches.304 
This analysis does not support, and instead squarely contradicts, the 
modernist position that all customary international law is applicable in 
                                                     
301. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. 
302. Id. at 428 (emphasis added). 
303. Id. at 428 (“Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-
encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity 
of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and 
recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous 
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates 
customary international law.”). The Court emphasized the historic role of the Executive branch in 
espousing claims against foreign states and the risks that judicial consideration of expropriation 
claims would undermine or conflict with Executive branch efforts. Id. at 432–34. 
304. As discussed above, the Court adopted different views of the act of state doctrine in Oetjen 
(which treated the doctrine as a rule of international law) and Sabbatino (which treated the doctrine 
as constitutionally-based). The critical point, however, is that, while adopting different rationales, in 
each case the Court looked to the character of particular rules of customary international law to 
determine whether they could be applied in U.S. courts. 
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U.S. courts (as some modernists have recognized305). The Court’s analysis 
also does not support the revisionist claim that customary international 
law is applicable in U.S. courts only when expressly authorized by 
congressional legislation or a treaty.306 Instead, Sabbatino made clear that 
customary international law would be applied by U.S. courts in a more 
expansive category of cases, depending upon factors that went well 
beyond express legislative authorization. As detailed above, these factors 
focused on the character and content of the relevant international law rule 
and the historic practice of the political branches (without requiring 
express legislative authorization).307 
Most recently, the Supreme Court adopted substantially the same 
approach in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,308 holding that the Alien Tort 
Statute309 authorized federal courts “to hear claims in a very limited 
category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.”310 
Again, although both modernists and revisionists have claimed support 
from the Court’s opinion,311 it provides only limited assistance to either, 
instead adopting a more nuanced approach. 
The Sosa Court affirmed that, upon independence, the United States 
“were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state,”312 and that 
“the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”313 
The Court then distinguished between different aspects of the law of 
nations, categorizing some rules as addressed to “the executive and 
                                                     
305. See, e.g., Stephens, Law of Our Land, supra note 6, at 450 (Sabbatino “cited The Paquete 
Habana in support of the proposition that ‘it is, of course, true that United States courts apply 
international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances . . . .’ Whether a particular case 
presents ‘appropriate circumstances’ may be subject to considerable debate” (internal citation 
omitted)).  
306. See supra section I.B; supra section II.A.2. It was clear that the Sabbatino Court did not hold 
that there was no applicable rule of international law, but rather that judicial application of such a rule 
had not been authorized. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428–29 n.26 (“We do not, of course, mean to say that 
there is no international standard in this area; we conclude only that the matter is not meet for 
adjudication by domestic tribunals.”). 
307. Other decisions adopted comparable analyses, affirming the possibility that customary 
international law rules apply directly in U.S. courts, but requiring evidence of authorization by the 
political branches. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 327–28 (1994); 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980).  
308. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
309. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  
310. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.  
311. See supra Part I; supra notes 11–14. 
312. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714 (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796)). 
313. Id. at 729. 
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legislative domains, not the judicial,”314 and other rules as falling “within 
the judicial sphere”315 or “admitting of a judicial remedy.”316 According 
to Justice Souter, in adopting the Alien Tort Statute, Congress did not 
intend merely to grant federal courts jurisdiction, but also to authorize 
federal courts to apply international law to a “modest set of actions” 
recognized at the time as violations of the law of nations.317 
Finally, the Sosa Court held that nothing “categorically precluded 
federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an 
element of common law,” but that “a restrained conception” of this federal 
judicial authority should be used when courts consider “a new cause of 
action of this kind.”318 The Court concluded that this legislatively 
mandated restraint required “any claim based on the present-day law of 
nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features 
of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”319 The Court cited 
Erie and emphasized the need generally “to look for legislative guidance 
before exercising innovative authority over substantive law,”320 and to 
consider “the practical consequences of making that cause [of action] 
available to litigants in the federal courts.”321 Applying this standard, the 
Court had little difficulty in concluding that Sosa’s claims did not rest on 
rules of customary international law that Congress had authorized the 
federal courts to apply.322 
The Court’s opinion in Sosa provides very limited support to the 
modernists and revisionists, and instead adopts analysis paralleling that in 
this Article. On the one hand, the Court unequivocally rejected the notion 
that all customary international law rules are directly applicable in U.S. 
courts, holding instead that federal courts can only apply a “very limited” 
or “modest” set of rules under the Alien Tort Statute. That squarely 
contradicts the core of the modern position, which is that all customary 
                                                     
314. Id. at 714. 
315. Id. at 715. 
316. Id.  
317. Id. at 720; see also id. at 721 (“[T]he ATS was meant to underwrite litigation of a narrow set 
of common law actions derived from the law of nations.”); id. at 724, 728–29.  
318. Id. at 725; see also id. at 729 (ATS permits “further independent judicial recognition of 
actionable international norms”). 
319. Id. at 725; see also id. at 731 (emphasizing need for “definite content and acceptance among 
civilized nations”). 
320. Id. at 726. 
321. Id. at 732–33. 
322. Id. at 738. 
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international law is “our law,” presumptively applicable and preemptive 
in U.S. courts. 
On the other hand, the Sosa Court also affirmed that some customary 
international law rules could be applied directly by U.S. courts, without 
express, or comparably specific, statutory authorization. In doing so, the 
Court focused on the content and character of particular rules of 
customary international law (including the specificity and unanimity of a 
particular rule) to determine whether judicial application was appropriate. 
This approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the revisionist insistence 
on specific legislative authorization for judicial application of 
international law norms, instead recognizing what Justice Souter termed 
in Sosa as the “discretion” of federal courts to undertake the “independent 
judicial recognition of actionable international norms,” based principally 
on the content of the relevant international law rule.323 That “independent” 
judicial “discretion” is impossible to reconcile with the revisionist 
analysis. 
The Sosa Court’s analysis again produces a result that is precisely 
consistent with the approach in Rose, Schooner Exchange, Paquete 
Habana, and Sabbatino, as well as that proposed in this Article. This 
analysis provides for direct judicial application of some, but not all, rules 
of customary international law, based upon an evaluation of the character 
and content of those rules and on the actions and intentions of the federal 
political branches. In addition to ensuring compliance with limits on 
independent judicial law-making, this approach parallels that used in 
determining whether provisions of U.S. treaties and other international 
agreements are self-executing, and ensures consistency in the treatment of 
all international law rules in U.S. courts. 
2. Federalism 
Judicial precedent also confirms that rules of customary international 
law are rules of federal law. It is true, of course, that pre-Erie decisions 
usually categorized customary international law as “general common law” 
rather than federal (or state) law.324 As discussed above, however, that 
categorization presents, but does not answer, the question of how 
customary international law should be characterized in an era in which 
there is no longer any general federal common law. In answering this 
                                                     
323. Id. at 729; see supra section II.B.1. Prior to Sosa, the revisionists were also adamant that the 
ATS did not provide a basis for federal courts to make or apply rules of customary international law 
as federal law. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 345–46. 
324. See supra section I.B; supra section II.A.2. 
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question, since Erie gave the issue importance, U.S. courts have 
consistently categorized rules of international law as rules of federal law. 
There is no dispute that, prior to Erie, various rules of the law of nations 
had the status of “general common law,” with federal and state courts free 
to interpret these rules as they considered appropriate.325 Likewise, 
various rules of the law of nations were held not to constitute federal law 
for purposes of statutory “arising under” jurisdiction.326 This clearly 
reflected the dominant approach toward customary international law prior 
to Erie.327 
On the other hand, some pre-Erie decisions appeared to treat customary 
international law as applicable in state, as well as federal, courts. As 
discussed above, Schooner Exchange announced a rule of foreign 
sovereign immunity that limited the jurisdiction of “an American court,” 
not a federal court.328 Moreover, the rationale for the Court’s decision—
ensuring the Nation’s respect for the law of nations and sovereignty of 
foreign states—applied equally to federal and state courts; not 
surprisingly, state and federal courts applied foreign sovereign immunity 
with equal force.329 
The same observations apply to the Supreme Court’s act of state 
decisions. Early act of state decisions applied what the Court 
characterized as principles of customary international law, supported by 
observations about judicial interference in the Nation’s foreign relations, 
to articulate a rule generally applicable to “the courts of one country,” not 
merely federal courts.330 As Sabbatino later held, the rationale for this rule 
was equally applicable in both state and federal courts.331 Similarly, 
federal courts’ prize decisions were effectively federal law, given the 
grants of exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction in the field.332 In 
                                                     
325. See Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442–43 (1924); Huntington v. Attrill, 
146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892); United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524–28 (1875). 
326. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286–87 (1876) (the Supreme Court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider claims arising under “general laws of war, as recognized by the law of 
nations,” because claims did not arise under “the constitution, laws, treaties or executive 
proclamations, of the United States”). 
327. See Huntington, 146 U.S. at 683; San Francisco v. Scott, 111 U.S. 768, 769 (1884). 
328. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812).  
329. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 113 
(2nd ed. 2003).  
330. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 
252 (1897). 
331. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416–17 (1964). 
332. See supra section II.B.1; supra note 262. 
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practice, therefore, much of the customary international law applied by 
U.S. courts prior to Erie was effectively national law, not state law. 
More fundamentally, pre-Erie judicial authority offers very limited 
assistance in determining whether customary international law rules are 
state or federal law, because pre-Erie courts treated international law as 
something else entirely: general common law. This characterization does 
little to address the question of how international law should be 
categorized if not as general common law. Moreover, this characterization 
of international law occurred in the context of a conception of law, and a 
relation of state and federal courts, that blurred or disregarded 
contemporary distinctions between state and federal law, instead 
conceiving of state and federal courts as being engaged in a cooperative 
endeavor to find an external corpus of customary international law.333 
Only when Erie abandoned that endeavor and its underlying conception 
of general common law did the status of international law as state or 
federal law become important. 
After the issue became important, post-Erie judicial authority provided 
relatively clear treatment of the status of customary international law. As 
discussed above, Sabbatino unequivocally endorsed the conclusion that 
“rules of international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps 
parochial state interpretations,” and then used that conclusion as the basis 
for holding that the act of state doctrine “equally” should be characterized 
as a rule of federal law.334 That decision leaves no serious doubt that rules 
of customary international law are rules of federal common law;335 efforts 
to explain this aspect of Sabbatino on other grounds are revisionist 
history.336 
                                                     
333. See Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 394 (“By the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, the general commercial law had become de facto preemptive of contrary state rules – as, in 
fact, had some of the more clearly ‘international’ portions of the law of nations.”); William A. 
Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of 
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1575–76 (1984) (“Even if the Court had no legal authority 
over the state courts on questions of general common law, it had a prominent, central and respected 
position in the American legal system . . . the state and federal courts created a remarkably uniform 
American law of marine insurance.”). 
334. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425, 427. 
335. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1833–34; Neuman, supra note 6, at 376.  
336. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 859–60. The suggestion that 
Sabbatino “only” held that the act of state doctrine, and not rules of customary international law, is 
federal law is particularly difficult to follow. The Court held that the act of state doctrine was a rule 
of federal common law in order to ensure a uniform approach to the question when customary 
international law rules would be applied by U.S. federal and state courts. The notion that this issue 
must be subject to a uniform federal rule, but the underlying rules of customary international law 
would not be, is untenable. 
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Other post-Erie decisions have confirmed that customary international 
law is federal law. In First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio 
Exterior de Cuba (“Bancec”),337 the Supreme Court adopted a rule of 
corporate attribution for companies owned by foreign states, formulating 
principles “common to both international law and federal common 
law.”338 The Court applied these federal common law rules, derived from 
international law, notwithstanding the fact that no federal legislation 
addressed the issue339 and that state (and foreign) law did address the 
issue.340 Likewise, the Court’s opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain made 
clear that the content of the customary international law claims that were 
authorized under the Alien Tort Statute—and the question whether those 
claims were in fact so authorized—were governed by federal law.341 In 
Justice Souter’s words, citing Sabbatino and other federal common law 
authorities, “Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new 
substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie 
understanding has identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may 
derive some substantive law in a common law way.”342 
These authorities are also consistent with more general standards 
governing the development of federal common law rules. Those standards 
have been discussed extensively elsewhere,343 and their application here 
follows non-controversially from the discussion above. In summary, the 
Nation’s foreign relations and international legal obligations are an area 
“involving ‘uniquely federal interests’ . . . committed by the Constitution 
and laws of the United States to federal control.”344 That is confirmed by 
                                                     
337. 462 U.S. 611 (1983). 
338. Id. at 623.  
339. As the Court noted, the FSIA did not prescribe any rule regarding the attribution of corporate 
responsibility. Id. at 620. On the other hand, as in prize cases and cases under the ATS, the Court was 
exercising jurisdiction pursuant to a grant of subject matter jurisdiction directed specifically at 
international disputes (i.e., the FSIA). Id. at 619. 
340. Id. at 622; id. at 622 n.11. 
341. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004).  
342. Id. at 729–30 (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) 
(“[I]nternational disputes implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations” are an area where 
“federal common law” rules are appropriate.)); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723, 730. Revisionist 
suggestions that Sosa did not adopt a rule of federal common law are also untenable. See Dodge, After 
Sosa, supra note 223. 
343. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
344. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). 
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the holdings in Sabbatino, Sosa, Garamendi, and elsewhere.345 Moreover, 
as also discussed above,346 independent state court decisions about the 
content of international law (and U.S. international legal obligations) 
undermine, and conflict with, federal authority in the field and the ability 
of the federal government to speak with one voice.347 As the Court 
declared in Sabbatino, Bancec and Sosa, this provides ample basis for 
treating customary international law as a matter of federal common law. 
These decisions and the analysis outlined above are impossible to 
reconcile with the limited conception of federal common law at the heart 
of the revisionist position. Rather, Sabbatino and its progeny declare 
broadly that “rules of international law” must be treated as federal law, 
not subject to “divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations.”348 
That, of course, does not resolve the question of whether these rules of 
federal law are applicable directly in U.S. courts, which requires separate 
analysis. But it does make clear that rules of international law, like the act 
of state doctrine, were not what the Supreme Court had in mind when it 
decided Erie. 
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: NON-SELF-
EXECUTING FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
As discussed above, both constitutional text and purposes, as well as 
judicial authority, require characterizing all rules of customary 
international law as federal law, rather than state (or foreign) law. 
Notwithstanding that conclusion, the same sources also provide that U.S. 
courts (both federal and state) may not apply a rule of customary 
international law unless the federal political branches have provided for 
judicial application of the rule. This approach treats all international legal 
obligations of the United States—treaties, other international agreements, 
and customary international law—in the same basic manner, and ensures 
observance of Erie’s limits on the federal courts’ law-making authority. 
In doing so, this approach safeguards both federal authority over the 
Nation’s foreign relations and constitutional limits on unauthorized law-
making by the judiciary. 
The approach outlined above can be readily applied and produces 
sensible, consistent results. As discussed below, this approach permits 
                                                     
345. See supra section II.A.2; supra section II.B.1. 
346. See supra section II.A.1. 
347. See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (“[T]he guiding principle is that a significant 
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law . . . must first be specifically 
shown.”); Radcliffe Materials, 451 U.S. at 640. 
348. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). 
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some, but not all, rules of customary international law to be given direct 
effect in U.S. courts, depending on the character and content of those rules 
and the intentions of the federal political branches. In particular, this 
analysis requires determining whether the political branches have 
expressly or impliedly provided for U.S. courts to apply a particular rule 
of customary international law. More specifically, the analysis requires 
inquiry into considerations paralleling those that apply when determining 
whether a U.S. treaty or other international agreement is self-executing. 
This analysis differs in critical respects from both the modernist and 
revisionist positions. Unlike both the modernists and revisionists, this 
analysis treats all rules of customary international law as federal law, 
regardless of whether those rules are directly applicable in U.S. courts.349 
This analysis also differs from the modernist position by requiring an 
inquiry into political branch approval of judicial application of customary 
international law, rather than concluding that the federal courts’ 
constitutional authority to make federal common law independently 
authorizes application of all rules of customary international law 
applicable in U.S. courts.350 Conversely, the analysis outlined below also 
differs from the revisionist position by providing a less categorical, more 
expansive approach to determining when the political branches have 
provided for judicial application of a rule of customary international 
law.351 Not surprisingly, this analysis produces results that differ from 
both the modernist and revisionist positions, providing for more frequent 
application of customary international law than the revisionists and less 
frequent application than the modernists. 
A. No Clear Statement or Legislative Act Requirement 
Preliminarily, and contrary to some statements of the revisionist 
position,352 the analysis proposed above does not limit U.S. courts to 
applying customary international law only when expressly authorized to 
do so by congressional legislation or a treaty. That position, adopted in 
some revisionist analysis, is untenable for multiple reasons. 
                                                     
349. See supra section II.A.1; supra note 135; infra section III.A. 
350. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1825–26, 1835 n.60; Neuman, supra note 6, at 372 n.6.  
351. As discussed below, the analysis proposed in this Article does not adopt either a clear or 
express statement requirement, or a requirement for legislative (or treaty) authorization. See supra 
section II.B.2; infra section III.A. More fundamentally, the analysis proposed below focuses on the 
content and character of the relevant rule of customary international law, rather than looking 
exclusively to Legislative or Executive branch actions (such as congressional legislation or formal 
executive suggestions).  
352. See supra section I.B; supra section II.B.1.  
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First, there is no reason to require express language or a clear statement 
to authorize judicial application of customary international law in 
congressional legislation, treaty provisions, or otherwise. Rather, 
generally applicable standards for interpreting legislation and treaties353 
should apply in determining whether the Legislative branch has provided 
for judicial application of international law. That is the approach that best 
ascertains Congress’s will,354 as well as the approach that has historically 
been taken by U.S. courts; those courts have readily implied authorization 
to apply international law rules from jurisdictional grants (like maritime 
jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Statute)355 and from the content and 
character of international law rules (in international agreements and under 
customary international law).356 It is also the approach that serves best to 
ensure that the intentions of Congress and the President with regard to 
U.S. foreign relations are given full effect: a rule requiring clear or express 
authorization by the political branches would necessarily frustrate those 
intentions in a material number of cases. 
Second, there is also no reason to conclude that only congressional 
legislation (or a treaty), as distinguished from Executive branch actions, 
can provide for judicial application of international law. Contrary to some 
statements of the revisionist position,357 neither constitutional text and 
structure nor judicial authority support a categorical requirement of 
congressional authorization for application of international law by U.S. 
courts. Instead, the extent to which Executive, as opposed to Legislative, 
authorization may support judicial application of international law rules 
depends on the distribution of foreign affairs authority between the 
President and Congress under the Constitution. Detailed discussion of the 
                                                     
353. Standard canons of construction permit the interpretation of both legislation and treaties to 
determine legislative intent in the absence of express language. BG Group PLC v. Republic of 
Argentina, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1209 (2014) (“[I]n the absence of explicit language in a treaty 
demonstrating that the parties intended a different delegation of authority, our ordinary interpretive 
framework applies.”); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 206 (1993) (“Even where 
congressional intent is unexpressed, however, a statute must be assessed according to its intended 
scope.”).  
354. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement 
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 637–38 (1992); John F. Manning, 
Textualism and The Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 124–26 (2001). 
355. See supra section II.B.1 (citing The Schooner Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 287 (1815) 
(admiralty jurisdiction over prize cases); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (ATS 
jurisdiction over violations of law of nations)). 
356. See supra section II.B.1 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432–33 
(1964); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–38). 
357. See supra section I.B; supra section II.A.2; Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 
4, at 354. 
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subject is beyond the scope of this Article, but, however it is resolved, it 
does not support the categorical rule suggested in some revisionist 
analyses. 
Consideration of the scope of the President’s foreign relations power 
arises against the background of persistent controversy about the 
distribution of the Nation’s foreign affairs powers between Congress and 
the President. In Professor Corwin’s words, “[t]he Constitution . . . is an 
invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign 
policy.”358 As a result, different conceptions of the allocation of foreign 
affairs powers between the President and Congress have prevailed at 
different times in the Nation’s history. In the early nineteenth century, 
Congress’s authority in matters affecting U.S. foreign relations was 
sweeping, and nearly exclusive.359 By the mid-twentieth century, 
however, the President’s foreign relations powers were almost as broad as 
those previously assigned to Congress.360 Most recently, the allocation of 
foreign affairs authority has been less categorical, with the President’s 
authority varying, depending on the extent of legislative support, 
acquiescence, or opposition, and on historical practice regarding 
particular issues.361 
In practice, the Executive branch’s authority to independently 
authorize judicial application of international law rules has been 
recognized in a wide range of cases—including with respect to immunity 
from U.S. judicial and legislative jurisdiction,362 claims settlement,363 and 
seizures of private property.364 Moreover, many contemporary actions of 
                                                     
358. EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 201 (5th ed. 1984); 
see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (Framers’ intentions “must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams 
Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh”). 
359. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814) (Congress, not the President, has 
constitutional authority to prescribe rules regarding expropriation of private property during war); 
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804) (President’s instructions to seize French 
vessels conflicted with congressional legislation and were unlawful). 
360. See generally United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 
324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“[V]ery delicate, 
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field 
of international relations.”). 
361. Compare Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 637, and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 
(1981), with Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015) 
(“[J]udicial precedent and historical practice teach that it is for the President alone,” and not Congress, 
“to make the specific decision of what foreign power he will recognize as legitimate.”). 
362. See supra section II.A.1; supra note 132; supra section II.A.2; Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship 
Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 143 (1812). 
363. See supra section II.A.2; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 336–37; Pink, 315 U.S. at 233. 
364. See supra section II.B.2; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712 (1900) (relying on 
04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2017  9:45 AM 
2017] CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS 1711 
 
the Executive branch occur in fields where Congress has legislated, often 
granting the President a substantial measure of executive authority; 
alternatively, Congress often acquiesces in the Executive’s conduct of the 
Nation’s foreign relations.365 In most cases, therefore, the issue will not 
be whether the Executive branch, acting against Congress’s will, can 
authorize application of a particular rule of international law, but whether 
the Executive, acting with a measure of legislative support, can do so. As 
a consequence, the President’s authority over aspects of U.S. foreign 
relations—including the power to authorize judicial application of 
particular rules of customary international law—will depend upon a close 
analysis of legislative and executive actions (and inactions) in a specific 
setting, just as the Court undertook in Sabbatino, Dames & Moore, 
Garamendi, and other recent decisions. 
In these circumstances, a categorical requirement for congressional 
legislation (or a treaty) would obstruct and complicate the political 
branches’ conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations by constraining the 
manner in which those branches exercise their constitutional authority. 
Likewise, such a requirement would disserve, rather than advance, 
separation of powers objectives by refusing to give effect to the will of 
the political branches in their conduct of U.S. foreign relations. Instead, 
as U.S. courts have historically done, the proper approach requires a 
careful assessment of the existence and character of both Legislative and 
Executive branch authorization for judicial application of particular rules 
of customary international law. As noted above, these issues are beyond 
the scope of this Article, but they plainly provide for a broad scope of 
Executive branch action even in the absence of express or implied 
legislative authorization.366 
B. Self-Executing Versus Non-Self-Executing Federal Common Law 
In determining whether the political branches have provided for 
judicial application of a particular customary international law rule, the 
approach proposed in this Article requires assessing considerations 
                                                     
Presidential Proclamation). 
365. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of 
the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1297–305 (1988); Rebecca Ingber, International Law 
Constraints as Executive Power, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 49, 84–90 (2016). 
366. The Tate Letter and Executive positions on other forms of immunity are obvious examples. 
See supra section II.A.1; supra note 132. The Supreme Court’s refusal to give effect to the President’s 
authorization for judicial application of international law in Medellín is a recent, and controversial, 
example of limits on the scope of Executive authority. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 490–99, 523–
32 (2008). 
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paralleling those relevant to determining the self-executing status of a 
U.S. treaty or other international agreement. This standard is readily 
applied and produces sensible results that are more consistent with 
existing judicial authority than either the modernist or revisionist position. 
It is true, as some commentators have observed, that the considerations 
relevant to determining whether a treaty is self-executing have not been 
consistently defined.367 These considerations can nonetheless be 
identified with sufficient clarity to permit reliably determining when a 
treaty provision is directly applicable in U.S. courts, as occurs routinely 
in practice.368 As discussed below, a similar analysis can readily be 
applied by analogy in the context of customary international law, much as 
was done in Sabbatino and Sosa.369 
Preliminarily, if the U.S. political branches have persistently objected 
to a rule of customary international law, then the United States will not be 
bound by the rule as a matter of international law,370 and U.S. courts will 
have no reason (or authority) to apply that rule. This is no different from 
cases where the United States has not ratified a treaty: in these instances, 
there is no treaty or other rule of international law to be executed by U.S. 
courts.371 Importantly, the question whether the United States has 
persistently objected, and whether there is any rule of customary 
international law to bind the United States, is an issue of federal law, not 
state law. 
Likewise, where the United States has not participated in the formation 
of a rule of customary international law, that rule will ordinarily not be 
directly applicable in U.S. courts. In these instances, there will be U.S. 
acquiescence in the formation of the relevant international rule, but there 
                                                     
367. Carlos M. Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 
695 (1995); Wu, supra note 178, at 579 (describing task of determining whether treaty is self-
executing as “recipe for chaos in judicial clothing”); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: 
Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4 (2002); see RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) 
§ 106 cmt. e. 
368. See supra section II.A.2; section III.A. In any event, dissatisfaction with standards for 
determining a treaty’s self-executing status can be addressed through refinement of these standards.  
369. See supra section II.B.1. 
370. See supra section II.A.1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102 cmt. d.  
371. This illustrates the importance of categorizing all rules of customary international law as 
federal law: a state court decision, adopting a rule of customary international law opposed by the 
federal political branches, could deny the United States persistent objector status, contradicting the 
United States’s position as espoused by the federal political branches and subjecting the (entire) 
United States to the rule. See supra section II.A.1. As discussed above, where federal courts, applying 
federal law, determine that the political branches have not authorized judicial application of a rule of 
customary international law, that determination would be binding on state courts, precluding their 
application of that rule of law. See supra section II.A.1; supra section II.B.1. 
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will (by hypothesis) be no evidence of any affirmative intention by the 
political branches of the United States to authorize direct application of 
the rule by U.S. courts. Absent such affirmative action by the political 
branches, again determined as a matter of federal law, there will generally 
be no basis for concluding that those branches have authorized application 
of the rule in U.S. courts,372 and, absent such authorization, no basis for 
judicial application of the rule. Instead, courts should apply a rule of 
customary international law only when the U.S. political branches have 
affirmatively provided for that rule to be self-executing.373 
Assuming that the United States has participated in formation of a rule 
of customary international law, there is no justification for adopting a 
general presumption either for or against judicial application of that rule. 
The weight of authority is against any presumption that all U.S. treaties 
and international agreements are automatically either self-executing or 
non-self-executing. Although some authorities have argued for a 
presumption that all treaties are self-executing,374 the Supreme Court and 
most other authorities have rejected that approach, declining to presume 
generally that all treaties are either self-executing or non-self-
executing.375 Instead, as discussed below, the better view (reflected in 
judicial authority) is that the self-executing status of treaties depends on a 
careful inquiry into the character and content of the specific treaty and on 
other evidence of political branch intentions regarding the treaty’s status. 
A similar approach is appropriate for determining whether a rule of 
customary international law is self-executing. If treaties, formally made 
in writing and ratified by the Senate, are not presumed to be self-
executing, there is no reason that customary international law rules, 
lacking comparable formality and precision, should be presumed to be 
                                                     
372. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 106 cmt. d (“Whether a treaty provision is self-executing is 
normally determined by the intent or understanding of the U.S. treatymakers . . . .”); id. reporters’ 
note 2. 
373. See supra section II.B.1. 
374. Carlos M. Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Law: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial 
Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 610 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of 
Our Law,” 88 TEX. L. REV. 91, 94, 94 n.22 (2009); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ 
note 5 (“strong presumption” that “political branches” consider treaties self-executing if not 
implemented). 
375. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 512–14 (2008); id. at 551–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(describing multiple factors bearing on whether a treaty is self-executing); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
§ 141(1)(a), (2)(a); see Paul B. Stephan, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1946–2000, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 317 (David L. Sloss 
et al. eds., 2011); Ingrid Wuerth, Medellín: The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV 
1, 3–5 (2009); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 106 reporters’ note 3 (“[C]ase law has not established a 
presumption for or against self-execution.”).  
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self-executing. Conversely, if the political branches have undertaken an 
international legal obligation on behalf of the Nation, but have not taken 
legislative steps to implement compliance with that obligation, there 
should be no presumption against judicial application of the rule.376 
In determining whether the U.S. political branches have provided for 
judicial application of a customary international law rule, the same basic 
analysis employed for treaties should be used. That analysis provides a 
workable means of ensuring that the political branches’ intentions, and the 
international commitments of the United States, are given effect. It avoids 
the categorical results of either the modernist or revisionist position, while 
applying an analysis that, despite academic criticism,377 has functioned 
satisfactorily in the context of treaties for two centuries. 
Applying this analysis, a critical consideration in determining whether 
a rule of customary international law is directly applicable in U.S. courts 
is the content of the rule, just as the text of a treaty provision is central to 
determining whether it is self-executing.378 The text or content of a treaty 
generally provides direct evidence of the political branches’ intentions 
with regard to the treaty’s self-executing character, and, for the same 
reasons, the terms of a rule of customary international law generally 
provide similar evidence of the self-executing character of that rule. Thus, 
where the political branches assent to rules of customary international law 
providing foreign states, heads of state, and foreign consuls with 
immunity in national court proceedings,379 or prescribing a particular 
choice of law rule,380 the terms and content of those rules themselves 
evidence the intentions of the political branches that the rules apply 
directly in U.S. courts (because, by their terms, those rules are addressed 
to the judiciary). 
Consistent with this, and as discussed above, U.S. decisions applying 
jurisdictional immunities imposed by customary international law 
emphasized that these rules were by their own terms “addressed to” the 
                                                     
376. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 5 (“[I]f the Executive Branch has not 
requested implementing legislation and Congress has not enacted such legislation, there is a strong 
presumption that the treaty has been considered self-executing by the political branches, and should 
be considered self-executing by the courts.”). 
377. See supra section II.A.2; supra note 164. 
378. Bond v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (2014); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519; 
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 649, 657 (2004); see RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 106 
reporters’ note 2.  
379. See supra section II.A.1; supra section II.B.1. 
380. See supra section II.B.2 (discussing First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior 
de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983)). 
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courts,381 while concluding that rules regarding recognition of 
governments, new substantive causes of action, or the proper 
circumstances for retaliation were “addressed to” the Legislative and 
Executive branches.382 In each case, the content of the relevant rule of 
customary international law itself evidences political branch authorization 
of judicial application of the rule. 
Other aspects of the content of treaty provisions, and by analogy, rules 
of customary international law, also bear on their self-executing 
character.383 Where a treaty provision is phrased in general or aspirational 
terms,384 or provides for future implementing actions by individual 
nations,385 then U.S. courts have generally held the treaty non-self-
executing. Conversely, treaty provisions that are specific, mandatory, and 
complete in character, not contemplating future implementing actions, 
have typically been held self-executing.386 The same analysis applies to 
customary international law, where courts have applied specific and 
mandatory rules, as evidenced again by decisions involving foreign state, 
head-of-state, and consular immunities.387 In contrast, U.S. courts have 
refused to apply ill-defined, indefinite, or aspirational rules of customary 
international law.388 That is made explicit in Sosa (which considered 
                                                     
381. See supra section II.B.1 (discussing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (act 
of state doctrine addressed to courts); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) 
(rules regarding judicial immunity addressed to courts); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808) 
(rules regarding recognition of judgments and judicial jurisdiction addressed to courts)). 
382. See supra section II.B.1 (discussing The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815) (rules 
regarding reciprocity or retaliation addressed to legislature); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 
Cranch) 110 (1814) (rules regarding seizure of property addressed to legislature)). 
383. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 507 (“[W]e have also considered . . . the negotiation and drafting 
history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory nations.”); id. at 549 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has found the provision’s subject matter of particular 
importance.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (“[T]he Senate[’s] . . . ratification 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of 
the document were not self-executing.”).  
384. See, e.g., Medellín, 552 U.S. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Other things being equal, where 
rights are specific and readily enforceable, the treaty provision more likely ‘addresses’ the 
judiciary.”). 
385. See Bond v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (“[The Convention] provides 
that ‘[e]ach State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary 
measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.’”); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
253, 315 (1829) (provision of treaty “seems to be the language of contract; and if it is, the ratification 
and confirmation which are promised must be the act of the legislature”).  
386. See, e.g., El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 157 (1999) (“[g]iven the 
Convention’s comprehensive scheme of liability rules and its textual emphasis on uniformity”). 
387. See supra section II.A.1; supra section II.B.1.  
388. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (requiring “a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 
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whether an asserted rule is “a norm of international character accepted by 
the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the 18th century paradigms we have recognized”),389 and 
Sabbatino (which considered “the degree of codification or consensus 
concerning a particular area of international law”).390 
Furthermore, where a treaty would undermine the political branches’ 
foreign relations authority,391 or core aspects of the states’ sovereignty 
over local social and political relations,392 courts have been reluctant to 
hold the treaty self-executing. Conversely, where a treaty prescribes 
commercial or procedural rules, applicable to relations between private 
parties, it is more likely to be self-executing,393 particularly when those 
rules concern international matters.394 The same analysis once more 
applies with equal force to customary international law: where a rule of 
international law would displace traditional state regulation of social 
relations (e.g., race or religious discrimination) or political structure (e.g., 
right to vote), the rule is likely non-self-executing. In contrast, rules 
establishing uniform international commercial regulations or dispute 
resolution procedures are more likely self-executing. Again, the principal 
                                                     
428 (1964) (“[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its 
own territory by a foreign sovereign government . . . in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous 
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates 
customary international law.”). 
389. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
390. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428; see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 106 reporters’ note 2 (“courts 
will consider whether the treaty provision is sufficiently precise or obligatory” and whether “it 
imposes obligations or creates authorities designed to have immediate effect, as opposed to 
contemplating additional legal measures”). 
391. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Would it create constitutionally 
undesirable conflict with the other branches?”); see also Wu, supra note 178, at 587–97. 
392. Compare Medellín, 552 U.S. at 532, Bond v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 
(“[W]e will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the 
sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.”) (quoting United States v. Bass, 
404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)), and Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing 
Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 60–63 (2012), with Neilsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 
52 (1929) (“[A]s the treaty-making power is independent of and superior to the legislative power of 
the states, the meaning of treaty provisions so construed is not restricted by any necessity of avoiding 
possible conflict with State legislation . . . .”). 
393. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]oes it concern the adjudication of 
traditional private legal rights such as rights to own property, to conduct a business, or to obtain civil 
tort recovery? If so, it may well address itself to the judiciary.”); Hathaway et al, supra note 392, at 
63 (treaties likely to be self-executing if they affect “economic or commercial relations between 
individuals . . . [or] transnational liability or litigation”). 
394. See generally Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) (Warsaw Convention is self-
executing); Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940) (Berne Convention and Paris 
Convention are self-executing). 
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focus is on the content and character of the relevant rule of international 
law. 
Another indicia of the political branches’ intentions regarding the status 
of a treaty are statements during negotiation and ratification of the 
treaty395 and, albeit less clearly, post-ratification statements.396 The same 
considerations apply with equal force to political branch statements made 
in connection with the formation and application of rules of customary 
international law. Thus, formal statements by the Executive branch, like 
the Tate Letter (concerning foreign sovereign immunity),397 or positions 
taken by the Executive in litigation (as in Schooner Exchange, Bancec, or 
Sosa)398 have been given substantial weight in determining whether to 
apply a rule of customary international law. 
In determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing, courts have 
also considered the status of related treaties.399 The same analysis applies 
in the context of customary international law, where the existence of 
reservations, understandings, or declarations with respect to treaties 
prescribing similar international obligations should be directly relevant to 
the status of a rule of customary international law. If the U.S. political 
branches ratify a treaty guaranteeing particular rights (e.g., voting rights, 
freedom of religion), but on the condition that the treaty is non-self-
executing,400 then derivative or analogous rules of customary international 
law should also be non-self-executing.401 
A specialized grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction is also relevant 
to authorization for judicial application of international law rules. As 
                                                     
395. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 cmt. h (“[A]ccount must be taken of any statement by the 
President in concluding the agreement or in submitting it to the Senate for consent or to the 
Congress.”); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 534 (“[W]hereas the Senate has issued declarations of non-self-
execution when ratifying some treaties, it did not do so with respect to the United Nations Charter.”); 
see also Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 164, at 149–56.  
396. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 cmt. h, with Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 164, 
at 156–57. 
397. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Phillip B. Perlman, 
U.S. Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Changing Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign 
Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 Dep’t St. Bull. 984, 984–85 (1952).  
398. See supra section II.B.1; supra section II.B.2; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); 
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983); Schooner 
Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).  
399. See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15–20 (2010); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506–14. 
400. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 330–31. 
401. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (“Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of 
interpreting and applying international human rights law, as when its ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of the document were 
not self-executing.”). 
04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2017  9:45 AM 
1718 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1641 
 
discussed above, specialized jurisdictional grants were present in prize 
cases (admiralty jurisdiction), claims under the law of nations (Sosa and 
the Alien Tort Statute), and choice of law rules for attribution of liability 
to foreign states (Bancec and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).402 
These specialized jurisdictional grants have, rightly, been interpreted as 
impliedly providing for the federal courts to apply the body of law that 
was most relevant and obviously applicable to claims falling within the 
courts’ jurisdiction, in each instance leading to a conclusion that the 
federal courts may (and must) apply relevant rules of customary 
international law.403 
Application of this analysis does not produce the categorical results of 
either the modernist or revisionist positions. Instead, this analysis requires 
more nuanced consideration of the content and character of particular 
customary international law rules and the positions of the political 
branches regarding those rules. In general, these considerations produce 
unsurprising and sensible results, consistent with the weight of judicial 
authority. Many rules of traditional customary international law—
concerning jurisdictional immunities and limitations,404 state succession 
and attribution,405 and treaty validity and interpretation406—would likely 
be directly applicable in U.S. courts. On the other hand, many “new” rules 
of customary international law—involving emerging human rights 
protections,407 limits on the use of force,408 and environmental 
obligations409—would presumptively be non-self-executing. The decisive 
questions in each case would be the content and character of the rule of 
international law—whether new or old—and the intentions of the political 
branches regarding that rule. 
                                                     
402. See supra section II.B.1 (discussing the prize cases and Alien Tort Statute); supra section 
II.B.2 (discussing FSIA); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 712 (1832) (“[T]he law 
giving jurisdiction to hear and determine this case not only authorises but requires us to decide it 
according to the law of nations and the stipulations of the treaty.w”). 
403. The existence of a specialized jurisdictional grant authorizing application of customary 
international law in some categories of cases (e.g., prize cases; ATS) does not mean that U.S. courts 
are authorized to apply all rules of customary international law. Rather, only those rules that fall 
within the relevant subject matter and that are addressed to the courts, as distinguished from the 
political branches, will ordinarily be applicable in judicial proceedings.  
404. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 401–16, 421–23.  
405. Id. §§ 208–10.  
406. Id. §§ 311, 321, 325–26, 331.  
407. Id. §§ 701–03.  
408. Id. §§ 101 cmt. a, 905.  
409. CRAWFORD, supra note 97, at 353–64.  
04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2017  9:45 AM 
2017] CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS 1719 
 
Finally, these results would limit the risks of judicial interference with 
U.S. foreign relations. The international law rules that would be directly 
applicable in U.S. courts would typically limit, rather than extend, judicial 
actions against foreign states and their nationals,410 or provide uniform 
federal rules for the application of other international law rules.411 In both 
instances, there would generally be minimal risk of offense to foreign 
states or interference with U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, the conduct of U.S. 
foreign relations by the political branches would be facilitated, by 
ensuring that customary international law rules which they intended to be 
applicable in U.S. courts were in fact applied, while precluding 
application of such rules when it had not been authorized. 
CONCLUSION 
The application of customary international law by U.S. courts raises 
intricate, and difficult, questions. None of the existing, categorical 
answers to those questions is satisfactory. This Article proposes an 
analysis to simplify and rationalize resolution of these issues. It does so 
by treating all rules of customary international law—like all treaties and 
other international agreements—as rules of federal law, subject to uniform 
interpretation by federal courts. In addition, this analysis requires—again 
as with treaties and other international agreements—an affirmative 
showing that the federal political branches have, either expressly or 
impliedly, provided for judicial application of customary international 
law. This inquiry requires evaluation of the character and content of the 
relevant international law rule, as well as statements of the political 
branches, related international agreements, and the effect of particular 
rules on traditional state regulatory authority and federal foreign relations 
interests. 
In contrast to existing analyses, the approach proposed in this Article 
produces sensible results that safeguard both separation of powers and 
federalism interests. On the one hand, this analysis ensures that the federal 
political branches’ conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations is not 
undermined by divergent or parochial state court interpretations of 
customary international law. On the other hand, this analysis limits the 
risks of interference by the federal courts in the conduct of U.S. foreign 
relations and unauthorized judicial law-making by requiring an 
affirmative showing that the U.S. political branches have provided for 
                                                     
410. Immunity from U.S. jurisdiction and presumptions against the extraterritorial application of 
national law are good examples. See supra section II.A.1; section II.B.1. 
411. Rules regarding treaty validity and interpretation and attribution of liability are good 
examples. See supra section II.A.1. 
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judicial application of particular rules of customary international law. In 
so doing, the proposed analysis simplifies and rationalizes the internal 
relationships between the several American sovereignties while 
simultaneously strengthening American sovereignty in dealing with 
external powers. 
 
